Recent philosophical analyses of implicit cognition and the origins of intuitions tend to rely, whether implicitly or explicitly, on some form of dual-process model. According to dual-process models, the high-speed cognition that shapes our intuitive judgments and inattentive behaviour is produced through a process that is distinct in kind from the one that produces attentive rational deliberation. Although this picture remains influential in empirically informed epistemology and ethics, it has come under significant pressure in cognitive psychology, where connectionist and predictivist models of cognition now dominate.

The aim of this conference is collectively to rethink these issues in empirically informed epistemology and ethics in the light of this development in the theory of cognition. We are particularly concerned with how the cognition underlying belief formation and moral judgment is best modelled, whether and in what ways that cognition is rational, and the implications of this for certain current issues in ethics, epistemology, and politics.

Draft conference schedule now available (pdf)



Tacit Knowledge and Subpersonal Processes
– Daniel Andler (Paris-Sorbonne)

A Genealogy of Intuitions
– James Andow (Reading)

Inferential Reasoning in Predictive Brains
– Matteo Colombo (Tilburg)

Conflict of Interest and the Psychology of Judgment
– Elizabeth David-Barrett (Sussex)

One System, Two Minds
– Keith Frankish (Open)

Why Aristotle Was Not a Two-System Dualist
– Kristjàn Kristjànsson (Birmingham)

Dual Processing Moral Judgment: Between the Intuitive and the Reflective
– Christos Kyriacou (Cyprus)

Authenticity and Practical Reason
– Alberto Masala (Paris-Sorbonne)

How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work within Radical Embodied Cognition?
– Mara Neijzen (Edinburgh)

Virtuous Uncertainty about Certain Intuitions
– Clea Rees (Cardiff)

Ethical Judgments and Subjective Motivations
– Simon Robertson (Cardiff)

Debunking and Vindicating Moral Intuitions
– Hanno Sauer (Duisberg-Essen)

What Makes a Rational Intuition Rational?
– Nicholas Shackel (Cardiff)

Emotions as Heuristics
– András Szigeti (Linköping)

Virtues and Vices of Thinking Fast and Slow
– Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff)

Reasoning in Implicit Bias
– Jonathan Webber (Cardiff)

A Two-level Framework for Understanding Implicit Bias
– Anna Welpinghus (Technische Universität Dortmund)