During the recent general election campaign in the UK, I received a flyer through my door from a local independent candidate who claimed to value, among other things, humanitarianism. He also wanted to repurpose the entirety of the UK\u2019s foreign aid budget to fix potholes on Britain\u2019s apparently neglected roads. To my mind, these two statements were inconsistent at best. How could someone at once value human life while also proposing to defund life-saving support for people who need it? Confused, I wondered if the candidate was just saying that he valued humanitarianism because it sounds good, if he had a peculiar conception of humanitarianism that prioritises the needs of motorists over people facing famine, or if he really did value humanitarianism but thought that fixing potholes would be a vote-winner? None of these potential explanations painted the candidate in a favourable light, so I didn\u2019t vote for him.<\/p>\n
One thing the candidate\u2019s flyer highlighted was the way in which we expect consistency between individuals\u2019 proclaimed values and their actions (or proposed actions), and how we see each as expressive of their characters. In my current research project \u2013 reviewing philosophical and psychological approaches to values and virtues \u2013 this thought takes on a particular salience and raises several questions. This is because we tend to think of virtuous people as having the right kind of values, which they skilfully and reliably manifest through their everyday actions, and whose characters we admire accordingly. But what kind of things should the virtuous value? How are those values themselves shaped by virtues, and which ones? What are values, anyway, and how can we identify and measure them?<\/p>\n
For Aristotle, and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists, eudaimonia<\/em> (human \u2018flourishing\u2019 or \u2018happiness\u2019) is the central value around which virtue is organised. Importantly, the relationship is not one in which the virtues should be seen as only instrumentally<\/em> valuable for achieving this end \u2013 but that eudaimonia<\/em> is itself constituted by virtue. Different virtue ethicists appeal to different values. Michael Slote (2001, 2013), for instance, suggests that the virtues are organised around the central values of universal benevolence and caring. Linda Zagzebski (1996) argues that the intellectual<\/em> virtues should be understood as finding their motivational grounding in the central epistemic values of wisdom and understanding. And Christine Swanton (2003) claims that there are as many relevant values as there are virtues when it comes to responding to the world in virtuous ways.<\/p>\n In psychology, while work on values has a long history \u2013 with Milton Rokeach (1973) paving the way for the contemporary and dominant theory of basic human values from Shalom Schwartz (1992; et al., 2012) \u2013 the virtues have until recently had much less attention. This has changed somewhat since the turn of the century, with notable contributions like Blaine Fowers\u2019 (2005) Virtue and Psychology,<\/em> and Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman\u2019s (2004) ambitious classification of character strengths and virtues. But while there now appears to be more engagement with the virtues in psychology \u2013 especially apparent in the proliferation of work in positive psychology \u2013 there remains a gap in understanding regarding how these traits relate to values.<\/p>\n Regarding the possibility of integrating philosophical and psychological approaches to values and virtues, there is some cause for pessimism. As Kristj\u00e1n Kristj\u00e1nsson (2018) (and others) have noted, the general reluctance amongst psychologists to engage beyond the \u2018fact\u2019 of the fact-value distinction is a common stumbling block, whereas matters of value are, of course, the natural domain for many philosophers. Although endorsement of value-neutrality is ubiquitous in psychology, that this itself expresses a kind of valuing is rarely acknowledged, while the admiration (and thus evaluation) of certain personality traits persists, often implicitly. Whereas virtue ethicists will commonly draw upon specific values (like those listed above) to ground their theories of virtue, psychologists tend to think that \u2018value is in the eye of the beholder, not in the object of perception\u2019 (Schwartz 2016: 63). This subjectivism might be accommodated by certain philosophical projects \u2013 like Valerie Tiberius\u2019 (2018) work on well-being as value-fulfilment \u2013 but it appears incompatible with virtue ethical theories grounded on values taken to be valuable no matter by whom<\/em>.<\/p>\n An alternative way of characterising this tension is to distinguish between the kinds of questions that practitioners in each discipline are, or traditionally have been, asking. Whereas psychologists have tended to ask, \u2018what values do people have?\u2019, philosophers err towards \u2018what is value?\u2019 or \u2018what is (or are) the fundamental source (or sources) of value?\u2019. To an extent these questions are conceptually distinct and can be pursued separately. We need not suggest a general theory of value or values to ask what people value \u2013 we can just work from an (albeit conceptually thin) understanding of value that is in line with our common usage. Moreover, philosophers can insist that what people value need not relate to what is of value. People of course value all sorts of things that are plausibly without ultimate value (racial purity or extreme personal wealth, for example). Treating these as separate but theoretically useful research topics rather than struggling towards an account of human values that coheres with a robust theory of virtue might be the best way forward.<\/p>\n One further significant question to contend with is the conceptual relevance of values to the virtues. While there are suggestions of an analysis here within the existing literature, there appears to be much more work to be done. Fowers (2005) proposes that the virtues are essential for the full realisation (or actualisation) of our values \u2013 a view also implied by the name of the Values in Action Institute (set up to support Peterson and Seligman\u2019s (2004) project). Elizabeth Krumrei-Mancuso (2017) details the many possible ways in which intellectual humility may be related to \u2018prosocial\u2019 values like altruism, benevolence, and universalism. More generally, the view that individuals\u2019 virtues express<\/em> their values is prominent and often presupposed \u2013 with Jennifer Cole Wright, Michael Warren, and Nancy Snow\u2019s (2021) rich interdisciplinary work giving perhaps the most philosophically rigorous and empirically engaged account of how values provide the motivational foundations for the development of virtue. Robin Dillon, on the other hand, claims that the vice of arrogance \u2018perverts our ability to value\u2019 (2007: 102), suggesting a more dynamic relationship between our virtues and vices and our practices of valuing (with the implication that, on one interpretation, virtues like humility may foster our ability to value).<\/p>\n While there are many theoretical possibilities and some likely impasses, answers to many questions may only be validated through engaged psychological study. The first priority might therefore consist in agreeing effective methods for identifying and measuring virtues and values. In contemporary analytic philosophy, conceptual clarity and precision is perhaps the greatest value, whereas psychologists must be more pragmatic, valuing theoretical constructs that can be effectively \u2018operationalised\u2019 in necessarily resource-limited empirical studies. It seems, then, that mutually satisfactory progress towards understandings of how values and virtues combine to create character will depend upon the considered appreciation of these two values amongst philosophers and psychologists in their future work. Only through such efforts might we hope to understand the confusing psychologies of election candidates, among others.<\/p>\n Photo by Marc-Olivier Jodoin<\/a> on Unsplash<\/a><\/p>\n References<\/strong><\/p>\n Cole Wright, J., Warren, M. T., & Snow, N. E. (2021). Understanding Virtue: Theory and Measurement<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n Dillon, R. S. (2007). Arrogance, Self-Respect and Personhood. Journal of Consciousness Studies<\/em>, 14<\/em>(5\u20136), 101\u2013126.<\/p>\n Fowers, B. J. (2005). Virtue and Psychology: Pursuing Excellence in Ordinary Practices<\/em>. American Psychological Association.<\/p>\n Kristj\u00e1nsson, K. (2018). Virtue from the Perspective of Psychology. In N. E. Snow (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J. (2017). Intellectual humility and prosocial values: Direct and mediated effects. Journal of Positive Psychology<\/em>, 12<\/em>(1), 13\u201328. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/17439760.2016.1167938<\/p>\n Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values<\/em>. Free Press.<\/p>\n Shalom H. Schwartz. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology<\/em>, 25<\/em>, 1\u201365.<\/p>\n —– (2016). Basic individual values: Sources and consequences. In T. Brosch & D. Sander (Eds.), Handbook of Value: Perspectives from Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology, and Sociology<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., Ramos, A., Verkasalo, M., L\u00f6nnqvist, J. E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., & Konty, M. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology<\/em>, 103<\/em>(4), 663\u2013688. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1037\/a0029393<\/p>\n Slote, M. (2001). Morals from Motives<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n —– (2013). Education and Human Values: Reconciling Talent with an Ethics of Care<\/em>. Routledge. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.4324\/9780203116555<\/p>\n Swanton, C. (2003). Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View<\/em>. Oxford University Press. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1093\/0199253889.001.0001<\/p>\n Tiberius, V. (2018). Well-Being as Value Fulfilment: How We Can Help Each Other to Live Well<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). Virtues of the Mind<\/em>. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/cbo9781139174763<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"During the recent general election campaign in the UK, I received a flyer through my door from a local independent candidate who claimed to value, among other things, humanitarianism. He […]","protected":false},"author":1319,"featured_media":2117,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[19],"tags":[148,168,298,62],"custom_author":[465],"class_list":["post-2113","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-open-for-debate","tag-moral-psychology","tag-value","tag-virtue-ethics","tag-virtues","custom_author-roe-henry"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p8KPlM-y5","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":2059,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/subjective-justice\/","url_meta":{"origin":2113,"position":0},"title":"SUBJECTIVE JUSTICE","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"July 8, 2024","format":false,"excerpt":"Can bad people be good judges?[1] This question would have been unintelligible before the rise of the modern state, when moral character and expertise were deemed as inextricably linked.[2] \u00a0Personal virtue was back then the mark of a good jurist and the judicial toga signified moral exemplarity. 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Thomas More, the author of Utopia, believed there is no need for lawyers in an ideal world, as its inhabitants will plead their own cause. Without lawyers, he thought, people will be more successful in determining what is true and what is false. 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There are many hurdles to overcome in the process of finding out about and sharing one\u2019s views on social and political issues. There is the long and difficult task of sorting through the mass of available information in search\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/07\/dan-meyers-hluOJZjLVXc-unsplash-2.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/07\/dan-meyers-hluOJZjLVXc-unsplash-2.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/07\/dan-meyers-hluOJZjLVXc-unsplash-2.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/07\/dan-meyers-hluOJZjLVXc-unsplash-2.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/07\/dan-meyers-hluOJZjLVXc-unsplash-2.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/07\/dan-meyers-hluOJZjLVXc-unsplash-2.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":2274,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/intellectual-virtues-online-part-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":2113,"position":4},"title":"Intellectual Virtues Online \u2013 Part 2","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"May 26, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"In my last entry, I praised the advantages of intellectual virtues in an online environment. This time, I briefly consider why too much of a focus on intellectual virtues might not be the best solution for the problematic aspects of the Internet after all. I discuss two issues, though they\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/service-pnp-det-4a20000-4a25000-4a25600-4a25686v.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/service-pnp-det-4a20000-4a25000-4a25600-4a25686v.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/service-pnp-det-4a20000-4a25000-4a25600-4a25686v.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/service-pnp-det-4a20000-4a25000-4a25600-4a25686v.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":2267,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/intellectual-virtues-online-part-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":2113,"position":5},"title":"Intellectual Virtues Online \u2013 Part 1","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"May 12, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"For the second year in a row, the World Economic Forum has ranked misinformation and disinformation among the top global risks. And few places provide more opportunities for spreading misinformation and disinformation than the Internet. From conspiracy theories about stolen elections, to biased search results[1], deepfakes of politicians and LLM\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]}],"meta_box":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2024\/09\/mirror.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2113","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1319"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2113"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2113\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2116,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2113\/revisions\/2116"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2117"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2113"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2113"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2113"},{"taxonomy":"custom_author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/custom_author?post=2113"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}