\u201cMost of the things that we take to be a fact in our lives are told to us through our stories, or the news that we hear. So, my question would be: if they were deceiving you with the stories they tell you, would you be able to recognize that?\u201d<\/p>\n
The excerpt above emphasizes our reliance on others for what we believe, and the vulnerability that results from this reliance. This excerpt would be appropriate to an introductory text concerning social epistemology. But it is instead taken from the introductory voiceover for the 2020 QAnon documentary Out of Shadows. <\/em>The remainder of the documentary promotes an escalating series of outlandish conspiratorial claims, including the notorious QAnon-linked allegation that Democratic politicians and celebrities are involved in the systematic trafficking and abuse of children. The documentary thus neatly illustrates an important role that conspiracy theories play in social and political life. The allure of conspiracy theories is due, in part, to the reminder of our epistemic vulnerability to others, and the abuses made possible by this vulnerability. In this way, conspiracy theories encourage skepticism toward putative experts. Yet conspiracy theories do not end at skepticism\u2014they instead encourage reliance upon alternative authorities and, in so doing, make possible the direction of collective activity toward potentially destructive ends.<\/p>\n While there is a lively scholarly debate as to the appropriate definition of conspiracy theories, let us stipulate that conspiracy theories are allegations of conspiracy that conflict with the widely-endorsed claims of relevant epistemic authorities. So understood, it is possible in principle for a given conspiracy theory to be true. However, that a given conspiracy theory is true will imply that the epistemic authorities\u2014those holding relevant credentials, positions, and the like\u2014are wrong. Thus, believing a given conspiracy theory requires rejecting the claims of epistemic authorities<\/a>.<\/p>\n Conspiracy theories can in principle arise naturally. Most obviously, if a given conspiracy theory is true, people may come to believe it because of evidence of the conspiracy. Belief in conspiracy theories might also be explained in terms of quirks of individual psychologies. For example, if individuals are overly prone to explaining events in terms of others\u2019 plans<\/a>, or are prone to finding illusory patterns in noise<\/a>, they might naturally be inclined to explain events in terms of conspiracies, even when experts demur.<\/p>\n However, the best explanations of belief in conspiracy theories do not always emphasize the psychological tendencies of individual believers. Instead, belief in such theories is sometimes due to the deliberate efforts of other agents. Consider, for example, a compilation of recommendations widely-circulated among QAnon communities under the title \u201cThe Basics of Effective Redpilling<\/a>.\u201d These recommendations, taken from an 8chan thread identified by the researcher \u201cdappergander<\/a>,\u201d include the following:<\/p>\n Everyone is Red Pilled at least a wee bit about SOMETHING, vaccines, GMO\u2019s, lobbyists, insider trading, Building 7, etc.). Find one area of skepticism first, then slowly work your way out.<\/p>\n The red pill metaphor is drawn from The Matrix <\/em>and widely used among conspiracist and extremist groups. To be red pilled<\/a> is, roughly, to reject some mainstream narrative while believing that this narrative is the product of deliberate deception. In the excerpt above, the suggestion is that being red pilled about some particular topic renders one prone to being red pilled about others. Conspiracism springs from a kernel of doubt.<\/p>\n But those who endorse conspiracy theories do not simply doubt mainstream narratives. To believe a conspiracy theory is to reject the claims of epistemic authorities while endorsing an alternative<\/a>. Nor does conspiracy theorizing involve consistent skepticism toward putative authorities. While conspiracy theorizing is widely associated with mantras like \u201cdo your own research<\/a>\u201d and \u201cthink for yourself,\u201d conspiracy theorists in practice rely heavily on the testimony of alternative putative authorities<\/a>. Conspiracy theorizing thus involves asymmetrical skepticism.<\/p>\n This asymmetricity contributes to the political utility of conspiracy theories, and helps to render believers in conspiracy theories vulnerable to co-option into political movements that are likewise at odds with epistemic authorities. For example, conspiracy theories tend to be central to populist and extremist political movements<\/a>. Thus, Steve Bannon, former advisor to Donald Trump, has described QAnon as \u201cdirectionally correct<\/a>,\u201d meaning roughly that it encourages distrust and hostility toward what Bannon regards as fitting targets.<\/p>\n One might suspect, based on evidence suggesting that belief in conspiracy theories and other political misinformation is rarer than often supposed, that the political utility of such theories is limited. For example, some experimental evidence indicates that endorsements of preposterous political claims are often merely expressive<\/a>, rather than reflective of sincere belief. However, conspiracy theories can be politically useful even if they are not believed by all parties involved.<\/p>\n Most obviously, as Quassim Cassam emphasizes in his recent book titled Conspiracy Theories<\/em><\/a>, such theories can be wielded by insincere parties to manipulate public opinion for or against certain political outcomes. In such cases, at least some of the parties involved hold sincere beliefs in conspiracy theories. However, conspiracy theories might in principle shape collective political activity even if no one believes them.<\/p>\n Suppose, for example, that everyone who presently expresses support for a particular conspiracy theory does so merely to signal, to themselves, to in-group members, or to outsiders, their loyalty to a given political cause. This phenomenon might shape collective political activity in at least two ways. First, if individuals widely endorse claims they don\u2019t believe to signal loyalty, this may give rise to pluralistic ignorance<\/a> among a community. In other words, community members might come to believe, like the subjects of Hans Christian Andersen\u2019s naked emperor<\/a>, that propositions they personally reject but publicly endorse are widely believed within the community. They may thus come to believe that acting contrary to these propositions will have negative social consequences. In this way, a conspiracy theory might come to be the rallying cry around which a community\u2019s activities are organized, despite most or even all individual community members disbelieving that theory.<\/p>\n Secondly, even if a conspiracy theory is initially influential among a community under conditions of pluralistic ignorance, this state of affairs may represent only a transient state in the evolution of the community\u2019s beliefs. Finding themselves among communities of apparent believers in a given conspiracy theory, individuals may set aside their doubts to sincerely embrace the apparent beliefs of their community members. After all, conspiracy theorists\u2014like everyone else\u2014take much of what they believe from the stories of others.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Photo by Colin Lloyd<\/a> on Unsplash<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\u201cMost of the things that we take to be a fact in our lives are told to us through our stories, or the news that we hear. So, my question […]","protected":false},"author":1319,"featured_media":1584,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"Keith Raymond Harris \"Red Pills and Rallying Lies: Conspiracy Theories, Skepticism, and Collective Action\" on Open for Debate","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[19],"tags":[132,236,366],"custom_author":[367],"class_list":["post-1581","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-open-for-debate","tag-american-politics","tag-conspiracy-theories","tag-qanon","custom_author-harris-keith-raymond"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p8KPlM-pv","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":2281,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/how-distant-can-conspiracy-theories-be-from-democracy\/","url_meta":{"origin":1581,"position":0},"title":"How distant can conspiracy theories be from democracy?","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"June 9, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"Imagine you are the leader of a democratic, liberal, prestigious, \u201cold\u201d party in a Western democracy of our time. We might bet that, if you held such a position, the burden of responsibility would feel particularly heavy on your shoulders: a significant portion of your former voters is flying to\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/06\/clark-young-Qtbx4j4UjRg-unsplash-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/06\/clark-young-Qtbx4j4UjRg-unsplash-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/06\/clark-young-Qtbx4j4UjRg-unsplash-scaled.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/06\/clark-young-Qtbx4j4UjRg-unsplash-scaled.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/06\/clark-young-Qtbx4j4UjRg-unsplash-scaled.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/06\/clark-young-Qtbx4j4UjRg-unsplash-scaled.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1677,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/can-people-be-epistemically-blameworthy\/","url_meta":{"origin":1581,"position":1},"title":"Can People Be Epistemically Blameworthy?","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"April 17, 2023","format":false,"excerpt":"We blame people for lots of things, such as stealing from others, forgetting our birthday, and voting for our political opponents. But it also seems that we sometimes blame people for their beliefs, and the way they respond to evidence. Holding inconsistent beliefs, applying epistemic standards unfairly, or being prone\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"A pointing finger","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2023\/04\/blame.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2023\/04\/blame.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2023\/04\/blame.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2023\/04\/blame.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2023\/04\/blame.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":2290,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/conspiracy-theories-and-their-epistemology\/","url_meta":{"origin":1581,"position":2},"title":"Conspiracy theories and their epistemology","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"June 23, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"You may believe that on 20 July 1969, astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed on the surface of the Moon aboard the Lunar Module Eagle. Or you might think that the moon landing was a fake, made in a film studio under the direction of Stanley Kubrick. You might\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/06\/secret.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":1242,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/conspiracies-and-counterspeech\/","url_meta":{"origin":1581,"position":3},"title":"CONSPIRACIES AND \u2018COUNTERSPEECH\u2019","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"July 12, 2021","format":false,"excerpt":"\u2018The 2020 US election was stolen.\u2019 \u2018COVID-19 was intentionally developed as a biological weapon.\u2019 \u2018Climate change is a hoax invented by the Chinese.\u2019 The times have been good for conspiracy theories. This, in turn, is dangerous. As these examples illustrate, conspiracy theories often sow confusion or scepticism about crucially important\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2021\/07\/Picture-Lepoutre-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2021\/07\/Picture-Lepoutre-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2021\/07\/Picture-Lepoutre-scaled.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2021\/07\/Picture-Lepoutre-scaled.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2021\/07\/Picture-Lepoutre-scaled.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2021\/07\/Picture-Lepoutre-scaled.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":938,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/the-epistemic-predicament-of-the-conspiracy-theorist\/","url_meta":{"origin":1581,"position":4},"title":"The epistemic predicament of the conspiracy theorist","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"June 15, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"A group of international public health scientists has recently published a statement in the prestigious medical journal The Lancet about the origins of the Sars-CoV-2 virus, the pathogen responsible for the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. In their statement, they report that on the basis of the publication and analysis\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/06\/4528869007_dbae1d6b03_o-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/06\/4528869007_dbae1d6b03_o-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/06\/4528869007_dbae1d6b03_o-scaled.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/06\/4528869007_dbae1d6b03_o-scaled.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/06\/4528869007_dbae1d6b03_o-scaled.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/06\/4528869007_dbae1d6b03_o-scaled.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":1669,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/a-conspiratorial-philosopher\/","url_meta":{"origin":1581,"position":5},"title":"A CONSPIRATORIAL PHILOSOPHER","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"April 3, 2023","format":false,"excerpt":"Although much is being written these days about conspiracy theories, the topic of conspiracy theorizing in philosophy is not discussed in the literature.\u00a0 Political epistemologists cherish easier topics, like the causes of the deaths of famous people, and conspiracy theories about science, pandemics and the like. But Heidegger offers a\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2023\/04\/Heidegger_3_1960.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]}],"meta_box":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/12\/Image-Red-Pills-and-Rallying-Lies--scaled.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1581","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1319"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1581"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1581\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1585,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1581\/revisions\/1585"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1584"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1581"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1581"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1581"},{"taxonomy":"custom_author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/custom_author?post=1581"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}