{"id":1406,"date":"2022-04-18T10:00:51","date_gmt":"2022-04-18T09:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/?p=1406"},"modified":"2022-04-18T10:08:48","modified_gmt":"2022-04-18T09:08:48","slug":"the-hidden-problem-in-moral-imagination","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/the-hidden-problem-in-moral-imagination\/","title":{"rendered":"The Hidden Problem in Moral Imagination"},"content":{"rendered":"<ol>\n<li><strong>Be more imaginative?<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>When we fail to treat someone in a morally appropriate way \u2013 say, being generous to the stranger in need, fair to the candidate who speaks with an accent, or patient with the friend struggling with anxiety &#8212; it is often thought that our lack of imagination is to blame: if only we could just step outside ourselves for a moment and really imagine what the other person is going through, we would better understand their situation and recognize the morally right response.<!--more--><\/p>\n<p>It seems then that morality requires us to \u201cexpand\u201d or \u201ccultivate\u201d our imagination that is otherwise \u201cinert,\u201d \u201cnarrow,\u201d \u201cunder-developed.\u201d Yet, a little reflection shows that this way of thinking about our failure in moral imagination is misguided. In most cases, our imagination is rather well-developed and actively engaged. The narrator in Ralph Ellison\u2019s Invisible Man finds himself invisible to people around him: \u201cWhen they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination \u2013 indeed, everything and anything except me.\u201d It certainly takes a robust imagination to blind those people from seeing the reality of the man.<\/p>\n<p>Or consider an example from personal experience described by the writer and philosopher Chlo\u00e9 Cooper Jones in her essay, \u201cSuch Perfection\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a> Born with a rare congenital disorder, her lower body is underdeveloped, her spine curved, and her height never reaching what is typical of adult women. Because of this physical difference, \u201cRomance was for me an incongruent concept. I wanted it, but the world treated me as though I was disqualified from it.\u201d Discussions of attractiveness among her teenage friends left her out not because she was unattractive; \u201cMy disability kept me, in the eyes of others, off that scale altogether, like an animal or a child.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Thus, before we heed moral philosophers\u2019 call to <em>be more imaginative<\/em>, we must examine how imagination figures in our perception of someone in the first place. In particular, if our imagination of their life is limited by our personal experience, how do we account for the rich imaginary content that too often occupies our minds? I argue that discussions of moral imagination and empathy too often neglect the role of <em>social <\/em>imagination in shaping an individual\u2019s imagination.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li><strong> Perception and social imagination<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The term, social imagination, is familiar to sociologists, but it is not foreign to the rest of us. We speak of <em>the mad scientist <\/em>or <em>the struggling artist <\/em>that inhabits the \u201cpopular imagination,\u201d and the <em>geisha <\/em>or <em>shaman <\/em>that captures the \u201cWestern imagination.\u201d As members of the same society, we share in a complex collection of images, ideas, associations, metaphors, stories, etc. that form and inform our individual imagination.<\/p>\n<p>We are already aware of the power of <em>images <\/em>in shaping our perception \u2013 we do not just see black or white, man or woman, tall or short, fat or skinny, covered face or bare feet; but we also \u201csee\u201d rich or poor, successful or struggling, beautiful or ugly, competent or lazy, friendly or threatening.<\/p>\n<p>Besides visual representations, stories constitute another important mode of operation of the social imagination. From legends, myths, fables, to literature, films, to news reports, <em>stories <\/em>\u201cfill in\u201d for us what is missing from our own experiences. When we encounter someone quite different, we fall back on these stories to make sense of them. R. G. Thomson gives a vivid example of how stories impinge on one\u2019s perception of \u201canomalous\u201d bodies:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>These stranger- or larger- or smaller-than-life tales can overwhelm the realities of the actual people whose bodies have given rise to these stories. Thus, our unusually shaped fellow humans can often blur into these creatures for whom they are the human referents. We see people with restricted growth, for example, through folk legends of curmudgeonly dwarfs under bridges or Disney versions of Snow White and her diminutive singing entourage. Tales of Goliaths bested by regular fellows and of plucky boys climbing beanstocks to conquer giants mold conceptions of very large people. Our notions of monsters come from horror stories designed to frighten. In this way, story structures staring.<a href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Concepts and conceptual associations also influence our perception, and they do so not simply in the form of <em>stereotypes<\/em>, something we are relatively more aware of. <em>Metaphors<\/em>, <em>connotations<\/em>, <em>symbols<\/em>, and the like affect how we see a person in ways that elude even conscientious self-reflection. In her discussion of blindness, Simi Linton opens the chapter as follows:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I once, on a whim, typed the word <em>blind <\/em>into my computer\u2019s thesaurus. The terms <em>ignorant, imperceptive, insensitive, irrational, oblivious, obtuse, random, rash, stagger, unaware,<\/em> <em>unconscious, uncontrolled, unknowing, unplanned, <\/em>and <em>violent <\/em>came up on my screen. My <em>Roget\u2019s<\/em> <em>Thesaurus <\/em>also provided <em>inattentive <\/em>and <em>purposeless<\/em>. These meanings lurk under the surface when the word <em>blind <\/em>is used, whether on its own or in pairings, in such phrases as <em>blind<\/em> <em>passion, blind rage, blind justice, blind drunk, <\/em>and <em>blind faith<\/em>.<a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Such ableist assumptions are so prevalent in everyday language that we hardly notice them \u2013 did you notice my disparaging use of the word, \u201cblind,\u201d earlier in the essay?<\/p>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li><strong>How our imagination falls short<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>As the above examples show, the problem with our imagination is not just that we often get things wrong, but that it tends to be partial to one set way of seeing the person, which happens to be mistaken. Moreover, the problem goes beyond what we imagine, but our very ability to imagine as well.<\/p>\n<p>The hold of social imagination derives its enduring strength in part from its (hidden) embeddedness in our experience: it is in our language, in the images and stories that surround us; reinforced by our parents, peers, and influencers we follow; encoded into rules of conduct in organizations and society as a whole; and played out in mundane moments of our daily life. Notably, the affective nature of imagination makes us especially susceptible to its power. Unlike beliefs, products of social imagination are bound up with feelings and so move us much more easily. Paul Ricoeur captures the vitality of imagination when he writes, \u201cthe imagination radiates out in all direction, reanimating earlier experiences, awakening dormant memories, spreading to adjacent sensorial fields.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a> It is difficult for reasoning &#8212; no matter the evidence and \u201chard facts\u201d given in support &#8212; to match the visceral impact of such things as metaphors and stories.<\/p>\n<p>We should be careful not to dismiss imaginative failures as \u201cmerely\u201d a result of stereotypes or biases. Social imagination reaches deep into our psyche (which is also a main reason why stereotypes and biases are hard to eliminate) not only because of its close connection with our affect, but also because it taps into our self-conception. When an able-bodied person meets someone like Chlo\u00e9 Cooper Jones, it is more than just a chance encounter between two strangers, but an occasion that calls into question one\u2019s understanding of a good life, what is normal, what makes us human, what makes life complete, and so on. If what informs our perception of someone else is rooted in the values and meanings informing our self-perception, it is then particularly resistant to change.<\/p>\n<p>By yielding to social imagination habitually and indiscriminately, we can become inflexible, passive, and complacent in exercising our own imagination.<\/p>\n<ol start=\"4\">\n<li><strong>Transforming imagination<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Therefore, it is not entirely wrong to say we need to \u201cexpand our moral imagination\u201d \u2013 it is true that we need to work on (\u201cexpand\u201d) our imaginativeness when perceiving someone, especially someone who appears quite different from us. It is also true that we need to \u201cexpand\u201d the possibilities that we imagine, but that does not mean we should overlook what is made readily available to us by social imagination. Indeed, it would be more apt to say the content of our imagination should be <em>corrected <\/em>or <em>transformed <\/em>rather than <em>enlarged<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>And once we realize this, we will also realize a further, more serious problem with blaming the individual alone for their failure of imagination: it assumes an atomistic picture of the formation of one\u2019s imaginative faculty, its exercise, and its contents. On the contrary, one\u2019s imaginings about someone with a disability, from a different race, and so on are very much products of a social imagination. So long as this fact remains unrecognized, much less addressed, the task of \u201ccultivating one\u2019s moral imagination\u201d is doomed to fail. This is not to deny individual responsibility in reforming their own imaginations, but only to emphasize the urgency and importance of reforming the social imagination at the same time.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> Jones, C. C. (2019, June 1). <em>Such Perfection<\/em>. The Believer. https:\/\/believermag.com\/suchperfection\/<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\">[2]<\/a> Garland-Thomson, R. (2009). <em>Staring: How we look<\/em>. Oxford University Press. 167.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\">[3]<\/a> Linton, S. (2015). <em>My body politic: A memoir<\/em>. University of Michigan Press. 213.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref4\" name=\"_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> Ricoeur, P. (2016). Imagination in Discourse and in Action. In <em>Rethinking imagination<\/em>. Routledge. 122-23.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Picture: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/rutty\/445427639\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Dave Rutt picture of sculpture by Marc Quinn, Alison Lapper Pregnant\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Be more imaginative? When we fail to treat someone in a morally appropriate way \u2013 say, being generous to the stranger in need, fair to the candidate who speaks with [&hellip;]","protected":false},"author":1319,"featured_media":1425,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"Yujia Song \"The Hidden Problem in Moral Imagination\" on Open for Debate","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[19],"tags":[338,336,337],"custom_author":[341],"class_list":["post-1406","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-open-for-debate","tag-disability","tag-imagination","tag-social-imagination","custom_author-song-yujia"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p8KPlM-mG","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":445,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/group-membership-moral-criticism-and-self-affirmation\/","url_meta":{"origin":1406,"position":0},"title":"Group membership, moral criticism and self-affirmation","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"May 21, 2018","format":false,"excerpt":"Public debates often involve issues that people find distressing, especially if they involve accusations of moral wrongdoing (even in the past) by groups with whom one identifies.\u00a0 People want to avoid guilt \u2018by association\u2019 and maintain a general belief that they are good, rational, and moral creatures. Avoiding such feelings\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Open for Debate&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/05\/black-and-white-bridge-dancing-70402.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/05\/black-and-white-bridge-dancing-70402.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/05\/black-and-white-bridge-dancing-70402.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/05\/black-and-white-bridge-dancing-70402.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/05\/black-and-white-bridge-dancing-70402.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/05\/black-and-white-bridge-dancing-70402.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":2188,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/terrorism-and-evil\/","url_meta":{"origin":1406,"position":1},"title":"Terrorism and Evil","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"January 20, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"On 1 January of this year, an American man drove his pickup truck into a crowd on Bourbon Street in New Orleans (Louisiana, US). Fifteen people were killed and dozens of others injured. The perpetrator, Shamsud-Din Jabbar, a resident of Houston (Texas), was inspired by the Islamic State\u2019s violent extremist\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Open for Debate&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/01\/New_orleans_12279946665_e7faf93133_c.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/01\/New_orleans_12279946665_e7faf93133_c.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/01\/New_orleans_12279946665_e7faf93133_c.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/01\/New_orleans_12279946665_e7faf93133_c.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":499,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/applying-findings-from-neuroscience-to-education-in-practice-and-educational-policy-making\/","url_meta":{"origin":1406,"position":2},"title":"Applying Findings from Neuroscience to Education in Practice and Educational Policy-Making","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"September 10, 2018","format":false,"excerpt":"In this blog post, the last post of my post series, I intend to outline, by means of concrete examples, how findings from neuroscience can contribute practically to the improvement of education. As a prior teacher in moral education in Korean secondary schools, I was interested in how to effectively\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Open for Debate&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/09\/Evstafiev-barocoa-school.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":1527,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/the-ambivalence-of-cynicism\/","url_meta":{"origin":1406,"position":3},"title":"The ambivalence of cynicism","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"September 19, 2022","format":false,"excerpt":"Cynicism seems to have an ambivalent status. On the one hand, \u2018being cynical\u2019 might mean dogmatic scepticism about people\u2019s moral character. A cynic can be arrogant \u2013 too smart, too savvy, to be taken in by illusions the rest of us pathetically take to be the truth. Some cynics work\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Open for Debate&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/09\/crazy-cake-08vpbfpq_II-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/09\/crazy-cake-08vpbfpq_II-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/09\/crazy-cake-08vpbfpq_II-unsplash.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/09\/crazy-cake-08vpbfpq_II-unsplash.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/09\/crazy-cake-08vpbfpq_II-unsplash.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/09\/crazy-cake-08vpbfpq_II-unsplash.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":908,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/ethicists-hold-your-horses-part-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":1406,"position":4},"title":"Ethicists, hold your horses  (Part 1)","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"May 18, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"\u00a0 \u00a0 Fleur Jongepier\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Karin Jongsma If intensive care beds or ventilators run out, who should be saved? And how should such decisions be morally justified? These are horrible, indeed impossible, decisions that clinicians currently face, or may be\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Open for Debate&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/05\/corona.2_0_image001-300x200.jpg?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":542,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/the-empathy-defense-emmett-till-open-casket-and-white-empathy\/","url_meta":{"origin":1406,"position":5},"title":"The Empathy Defense: Emmett Till, &#8220;Open Casket,&#8221; and &#8216;White Empathy&#8217;","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"November 19, 2018","format":false,"excerpt":"\u201cA painting of a dead black boy by a white artist.\u201d This is British artist Hannah Black's description of Dana Schutz's Open Casket, a painting included in the 2017 Whitney Biennial and one that Black has urged be destroyed. The 'dead black boy' is Emmett Till, a fourteen-year-old who was\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Open for Debate&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/10\/SCH-16_012aL2-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/10\/SCH-16_012aL2-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/10\/SCH-16_012aL2-scaled.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/10\/SCH-16_012aL2-scaled.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/10\/SCH-16_012aL2-scaled.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2018\/10\/SCH-16_012aL2-scaled.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]}],"meta_box":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2022\/04\/Rutt_Alison_Lapper_445427639_54f3cc2e3f_c.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1406","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1319"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1406"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1406\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1426,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1406\/revisions\/1426"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1425"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1406"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1406"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1406"},{"taxonomy":"custom_author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/custom_author?post=1406"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}