{"id":1323,"date":"2021-11-29T10:00:06","date_gmt":"2021-11-29T10:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/?p=1323"},"modified":"2021-11-26T19:12:26","modified_gmt":"2021-11-26T19:12:26","slug":"choosing-a-future-for-humanity-effective-altruism-and-longtermism-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/choosing-a-future-for-humanity-effective-altruism-and-longtermism-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Choosing a future for humanity: effective altruism and longtermism: Part 2"},"content":{"rendered":"

In discussions among the charity evaluators whom I described in the previous post, Derek Parfit is often quoted as saying that we live at \u2018the hinge of history\u2019<\/a>. What he meant is that we live at a time when we have at our disposal the means to do greater good than ever before, and the means to do greater harm. With the advent of nuclear power, gene-editing, and advanced artificial intelligence, among other technologies, the same knowledge and ability can be used to either end. When we talk of the hinge of history, we often focus on two things: our capacity to create a wonderful, emancipated, just, happy future for all, in which everyone has what they need to pursue their chosen way of life; and our capacity to end all possibility of this future by destroying ourselves. But we less often talk in philosophy of our ability to create a future of unrelenting misery, enslavement, alienation, and pain for numbers of people many many times greater than have inhabited the Earth so far (though of course science fiction has walked this beat for many years). Yet many of the technologies that might bring us great happiness in a long-term human future or cause our extinction in the near future might equally bring great misery in the long-term future (again, a trope of science fiction). As I said in the previous post, the charity evaluators are aware of this and advocate for work to make the deployment of these technologies safer, more secure; to tip us towards the wonderful future. But the long-term effects of such research are hard to predict. It is quite possible that unintended negative consequences are just as likely as the positive consequences they intend; indeed, it\u2019s quite possible that they are more likely. We see something like this with so-called gain-of-function research on viruses, which have recently been in the news because of the \u2018lab leak\u2019 hypothesis about the origin of the novel coronavirus. In that sort of work, virologists engineer more dangerous versions of the virus than have naturally occurred so far in order to understand possible future mutations and develop protections against them. But doing so of course opens the possibility that these enhanced microbes escape the lab where they\u2019re created, and the possibility that a bad actor will exploit them to devastating effect\u2014with only the threat of ever deploying them, they might hold societies to ransom. And the same might happen as we research AI safety, for instance, or nuclear safety. By dreaming up the horrific uses to which these technologies might be put in order to guard against them, we might make create blueprints that make these uses more likely.<\/p>\n

So one concern about the charity evaluators\u2019 claim that it is better to fund activities that seeks to make our long-term happy survival more likely is that those same activities make our long-term unhappy survival more likely as well. And if that\u2019s the case, maybe such funding has no greater expected utility than doing nothing at all. Perhaps the possible benefits and possible harms, colossal though they are, point in opposite directions with equal magnitude and our interventions increase the chance of one only by increasing the chance of the other by the same amount; and if that\u2019s true, the expected utility of such an intervention is zero and you\u2019d do better to donate to AMF, which at least has a positive expected utility.<\/p>\n

But even if we think our efforts make the vast happy future for humanity more likely than the vast miserable one, there are reasons to think we should work to ensure neither comes about. Let\u2019s see why.<\/p>\n

Suppose, for a moment, that you are a keen birdwatcher. Every time you see a new species it gives you great pleasure. What\u2019s more, the amount of extra pleasure each new species brings is the same no matter how many you\u2019ve seen before. Your first species\u2014a blue tit in your grandparents\u2019 garden as a child\u2014adds as much happiness to your stock as your two hundredth\u2014a golden eagle high above Glenshee when you\u2019re 30. Now suppose I offer to take you on a birding trip. I offer two possible locations: in one, you\u2019re sure to see 10 new species; in the other, you might see 20 or your might see none, depending on whether the migration has started yet, and looking back on records from previous years, I conclude that there\u2019s a 60% chance you\u2019ll see twenty. Which do you choose? The decision rule used by the charity evaluators would have you calculate the expected value of each option: 10 species for sure, or 60% chance of 20 and 40% chance of 0\u2014an expectation of 12 species. Nonetheless, in such situations, many people will choose the risk-free option. For them, the 60% chance of the 20 new species isn\u2019t enough to outweigh the 40% chance of none when there is 100% chance of 10 in the first location. What\u2019s more, this doesn\u2019t seem unreasonable. And indeed there is a suite of alternatives to expected utility theory<\/a> that permit such aversion to risk. Roughly speaking, each says that the risk averse person should give greater weight to the worse outcomes than expected utility theory would advise, and less weight to the better ones.<\/p>\n

The problem for the charity evaluator is that you might take this approach not only to your choice of bird reserve, but also to your choice of recipient for your \u00a3100 donation. To simplify considerably, suppose we face three options:<\/p>\n