{"id":1005,"date":"2020-09-07T10:00:20","date_gmt":"2020-09-07T09:00:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/?p=1005"},"modified":"2020-09-05T08:27:02","modified_gmt":"2020-09-05T07:27:02","slug":"why-are-we-so-polarized-and-how-can-we-move-forward-a-perspective-from-social-epistemology","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/why-are-we-so-polarized-and-how-can-we-move-forward-a-perspective-from-social-epistemology\/","title":{"rendered":"Why are we so polarized, and how can we move forward? A perspective from social epistemology."},"content":{"rendered":"

Contemporary academic philosophy has recently taken a \u201csocial turn\u201d regarding the way it thinks about knowledge and related issues.\u00a0 Put differently, philosophy has turned away from the traditional ideal of a self-sufficient inquirer, doing his or her best to figure out what is reasonable to believe, in favor of a conception of knowledge that emphasizes the importance of \u201csocial-epistemic dependence\u201d on others.\u00a0 The dependence is \u201csocial\u201d in that it is a dependence on other persons<\/em>, as well as other aspects of a knower\u2019s social environment, including facts about how that environment is socially organized.\u00a0 The dependence is \u201cepistemic\u201d in the sense that it is a dependence on others for one\u2019s knowledge<\/em>, as well as for other intellectual goods, such as reasonable belief or opinion.<\/p>\n

Very much related to all this, a number of contemporary philosophers have sought to emphasize the role of trust<\/em> in shaping our intellectual lives.\u00a0 That is, they have been concerned with how a moral\u2014or at least practical\u2014relation to other persons influences such things as what knowledge we have and which of our opinions count as reasonable or rational.\u00a0 At first glance, this can seem to stray too far from traditional ways of thinking about knowledge and belief.\u00a0 Intellectual standings such as knowledge and reasonable judgment seemingly have more to do with evidence and good reasoning than with our moral and practical relationships to other persons.\u00a0 And even if personal relationships and other social factors can provide a psychological <\/em>explanation for why a person holds the beliefs that they do, such factors seem irrelevant to explaining how or why a person\u2019s beliefs are reasonable, rational, or otherwise intellectually respectable.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, it seems to me that the reasons behind the new \u201csocial epistemology\u201d are ultimately compelling.\u00a0 In particular, this new way of thinking helps to explain quite a bit about our current social and political landscape, including its echo chambers, \u201cfake news,\u201d \u201calternative facts,\u201d and increasingly insulated world views. \u00a0One salient feature of that landscape is the way in which opposing groups increasingly characterize each other as either intellectually or morally flawed.\u00a0 That is, the default explanation for opposing opinions is that those holding them must be either stupid or evil, or perhaps both.\u00a0 This is a disturbing situation, not least because it invites us to characterize other people as \u201clost causes.\u201d\u00a0 How can you reason with someone who is too stupid to see the plain facts, or too immoral to care?\u00a0 What is disturbing, then, is not only the sad state that we are in, but also the poor prospects for advancing out of it.<\/p>\n

I said above that the new social epistemology helps to diagnose what has gone on here.\u00a0 But just as importantly, it seems to me, it gives us resources for hope rather than pessimism regarding how to move forward.\u00a0 Specifically, it gives us resources for seeing other people\u2014even those with whom we most vehemently disagree\u2014 as reasonable<\/em> rather than morally and\/or intellectually flawed.\u00a0 And if we can see people as reasonable rather than just stupid or immoral, we can see them as reasonable to talk with and otherwise engage. This oversimplifies, of course, because reasonableness is not an all-or-nothing thing.\u00a0 The more careful point is that social epistemology gives us resources for seeing people and their opinions as more<\/em> reasonable, less<\/em> flawed, than we otherwise might.\u00a0 And this means resources for addressing a social and political situation that might otherwise seem intractable.<\/p>\n

But how is all of this supposed to go?\u00a0 To see it, we need to get some ideas on the table.\u00a0 Specifically, I draw attention to an important category and then three plausible points.<\/p>\n

The important category is that of an epistemic community, defined as a group of people who are cooperating with respect to some set of information-dependent tasks.\u00a0 That is, an epistemic community is a group of persons who are cooperating to get something done, and whose cooperation depends on their sharing relevant information.\u00a0 For example, a business corporation constitutes an epistemic community in this sense, insofar as it involves people cooperating so as to conduct appropriate business, and insofar as that involves sharing relevant information (about product quality, supply chains, sales, etc.) in the process.\u00a0 So is a family an epistemic community, insofar as family members cooperate in the course of \u201cfamily business,\u201d and must share relevant information in doing so.\u00a0 In fact, epistemic communities are all over the place, they overlap and intersect, and they go in and out of existence all the time.\u00a0 And everyone of us, at any given time, is a member of several such communities.<\/p>\n

The first point to make is that epistemic communities, as such, have two important concerns: a) the acquisition of quality information for the purpose of carrying out their relevant work; and b) the distribution of that information to those who need it.\u00a0 The second concern is closely related to the idea that epistemic communities take advantage of a division of epistemic labor.\u00a0 That is, the person who acquires relevant information (about recent sales, for example) is not always the person, or not always the only person, who needs it.\u00a0 The possibility of sharing<\/em> relevant information, so that not everyone has to do everything for themselves, is one of the strongest motivations for having epistemic communities in the first place.<\/p>\n

This brings us to a second important point.\u00a0 Namely, that epistemic communities are also characterized by norms<\/em> or standards<\/em> for acquiring and distributing relevant information.\u00a0 This is a different way of saying that epistemic communities have an interest in quality<\/em> information, or information that meets relevant standards for reliability and accuracy.\u00a0 Moreover, the norms or standards governing the acquisition of information will be different from those governing the distribution of information.\u00a0 That is because our dominant concern when acquiring information is quality control<\/em>\u2014we want only accurate and reliable information to get into the system in the first place.\u00a0 But our dominant concern when distributing information is to get it to the people who need it.\u00a0 That does not mean that quality control is irrelevant to information distribution, but that it plays a less important role than in the acquisition stage.\u00a0 Consider the analogy of a military base.\u00a0 There are high standards for getting in through the gates\u2014 identifications must be checked, perhaps vehicles will be searched, or other tests will have to be passed.\u00a0 But once in, a person is not then allowed to go wherever they please\u2014there are rules for who is allowed to go where and when even within the base.\u00a0 Nevertheless, the rules for getting through the gates in the first place are not the same as those for travelling around once in, nor should they be.<\/p>\n

And now for the third and final point that is needed.\u00a0 Namely, that informational transactions with other persons occur both in the service of information acquisition (in service of getting quality information into the community) and in the service of information distribution (in service of sharing quality information with others in the community).\u00a0 And that means that different informational transactions will be evaluated differently, depending on the context in which they occur.\u00a0 Put differently, information coming from other persons will be evaluated according to different norms and standards, and appropriately so<\/em>, depending on whether that person is a member of one\u2019s own epistemic community.<\/p>\n

To illustrate, consider a conversation that takes place between a job applicant and a personnel director.\u00a0 Clearly, it would be inappropriate for the personnel director to simply believe whatever the job applicant tells her\u2014for example, that he has some relevant expertise, or that the people at his former job loved him.\u00a0 On the contrary, it is the job of the personnel director to evaluate that information as believable or not, and she would be failing at her job if she did not do so with proper diligence.\u00a0 Contrast that exchange with another:\u00a0 After due diligence, the personnel director reports to her CEO on the applicant\u2019s qualifications.\u00a0 Relative to this context, it is<\/em> appropriate for the CEO to trust what the personnel director tells her.\u00a0 More carefully, it is appropriate for the CEO to treat her conversation with the personnel director differently<\/em> than the personnel director treated her conversation with the job applicant. And that is because the second conversation takes place in a context of cooperation that the first conversation does not.<\/p>\n

The same point can be made in terms of an appropriate division of labor.\u00a0 A corporation would be dysfunctional if its CEO had to apply the same standards of care in evaluating her personnel director\u2019s reports as the personal director should apply in evaluating a job applicant\u2019s reports.\u00a0 On the contrary, a well-functioning corporation is defined by the kinds of cooperation that allow for efficient divisions of labor, and in this case an efficient division of epistemic labor.\u00a0 That point holds for epistemic communities more generally. By their very nature, well-functioning epistemic communities are defined by relationships of cooperation and trust that allow for an efficient division of epistemic labor.\u00a0 And that normative structure entails that information coming from different persons will be evaluated differently, and appropriately so<\/em>, depending on those persons\u2019 relationships to the relevant epistemic community.<\/p>\n

In sum, the very nature of epistemic communities entails that different people should be afforded different levels of trust, that information coming from different people should be evaluated according to different standards.\u00a0 And that explains a lot about how things can go bad.\u00a0 For suppose that a community initially gets something wrong, for whatever reason.\u00a0 That mistake, once made, will be more easily distributed within the community.\u00a0 Moreover, that mistake will be more difficult to correct, insofar as opposing information from outside the community will be evaluated by a higher standard.\u00a0 This is because any<\/em> information, mistaken or not, will be evaluated by higher standards if coming from outside a community than if coming from within it.\u00a0 What is worse, this is a necessary consequence of a well-functioning<\/em> epistemic community.\u00a0 In other words, people within an epistemic community are right<\/em> to assess information according to these varying standards. This explains why, once an opinion gains a foothold within a community, it can be hard to root out, mistaken or not.\u00a0 No stupidity or immorality is necessary to drive the explanation.\u00a0 That is not to say, of course, that epistemic communities and the people within them are never stupid or immoral!\u00a0 It is only to say that those factors are not needed, in principle anyway, to explain entrenched disagreement between different communities.\u00a0 To frame the point differently, such factors need not exhaust our explanations regarding why people disagree with us.\u00a0 The picture can be more complicated.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, resources in social epistemology can help us to explain entrenched disagreements and even polarization among different communities.\u00a0 But what about resources for moving away from polarization and toward agreement?\u00a0 Here things can seem grim.\u00a0 In fact, our explanation seems to predict increasing<\/em> polarization, especially between communities that are already characterized by mutual distrust.\u00a0 I want to suggest that there is a way forward, however, and one suggested by our social epistemology model.\u00a0 It involves the hard work of building better, or at least different, epistemic communities.\u00a0 And that involves the hard work of building relationships of trust.\u00a0 One reason for hope in this regard is that the boundaries of epistemic communities are neither rigid nor singular.\u00a0 As noted above, epistemic communities intersect and overlap, and they come in and out of existence all the time.\u00a0 Moreover, relationships of cooperation and trust come in any number and variety, including family relations and friendships.\u00a0 Finally, each of us is already a member of multiple epistemic communities.\u00a0 All of this makes for opportunities to reshape our existing communities and to build new ones, and to thereby interrupt and redirect existing flows of information.\u00a0 That, admittedly, is not easy to do.\u00a0 But it is the hopeful alternative to treating each other as lost causes.<\/p>\n

This post is based on some ideas from the author’s recent book The Transmission of Knowledge<\/em> available from Cambridge University Press.<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Contemporary academic philosophy has recently taken a \u201csocial turn\u201d regarding the way it thinks about knowledge and related issues.\u00a0 Put differently, philosophy has turned away from the traditional ideal of […]","protected":false},"author":1319,"featured_media":1012,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"On Open for Debate \"Why are we so polarized, and how can we move forward? A perspective from social epistemology.\" by John Greco","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[19],"tags":[253,8,247,91],"custom_author":[254],"class_list":["post-1005","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-open-for-debate","tag-knowledge-transmission","tag-polarization","tag-social-epistemology","tag-trust","custom_author-greco-john"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p8KPlM-gd","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":829,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/depending-on-others-for-knowledge\/","url_meta":{"origin":1005,"position":0},"title":"Depending on others for knowledge","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"January 13, 2020","format":false,"excerpt":"We depend on others. We depend on others when we are sick or when we need help moving into a new house. We also depend on others for knowledge. We learn from books written by other people. Children learn from teachers in school. If we are lost in a city,\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/01\/newspaper1.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":2296,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/trust-and-the-epistemic-goods\/","url_meta":{"origin":1005,"position":1},"title":"Trust and the epistemic goods","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"July 7, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"Trust is immensely important to us: without it, as Annette Baier famously put it, many things we care about would be unsafe. 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By this time, the story had been reported by\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/10\/michal-lis-1mazop8Y1ss-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/10\/michal-lis-1mazop8Y1ss-unsplash.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/10\/michal-lis-1mazop8Y1ss-unsplash.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/10\/michal-lis-1mazop8Y1ss-unsplash.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/10\/michal-lis-1mazop8Y1ss-unsplash.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/10\/michal-lis-1mazop8Y1ss-unsplash.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":2030,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/non-ideal-epistemology-as-a-guidance-for-inquiry\/","url_meta":{"origin":1005,"position":4},"title":"Non-ideal epistemology as a guidance for inquiry","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"May 27, 2024","format":false,"excerpt":"In our daily lives, we conduct numerous inquiries. Some of them are aimed at questions that have no significant impact on our lives, such as which restaurant in town has the best sushi, what does our friend want for her birthday, or in which year the last album of our\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2024\/05\/Tomat_photo_blogpost-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2024\/05\/Tomat_photo_blogpost-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2024\/05\/Tomat_photo_blogpost-scaled.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2024\/05\/Tomat_photo_blogpost-scaled.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2024\/05\/Tomat_photo_blogpost-scaled.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2024\/05\/Tomat_photo_blogpost-scaled.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":2267,"url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/intellectual-virtues-online-part-1\/","url_meta":{"origin":1005,"position":5},"title":"Intellectual Virtues Online \u2013 Part 1","author":"Alessandra Tanesini","date":"May 12, 2025","format":false,"excerpt":"For the second year in a row, the World Economic Forum has ranked misinformation and disinformation among the top global risks. And few places provide more opportunities for spreading misinformation and disinformation than the Internet. From conspiracy theories about stolen elections, to biased search results[1], deepfakes of politicians and LLM\u2026","rel":"","context":"In "Open for Debate"","block_context":{"text":"Open for Debate","link":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/category\/open-for-debate\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2025\/05\/pexels-marcelo-moreira-988124-2225771-scaled.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]}],"meta_box":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/533\/2020\/09\/canstockphoto48175967-scaled.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1005","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1319"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1005"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1005\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1013,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1005\/revisions\/1013"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1012"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1005"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1005"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1005"},{"taxonomy":"custom_author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.cardiff.ac.uk\/openfordebate\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/custom_author?post=1005"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}