This is going to be very much an assortment of different things which have been happening in the background (partly because I have just completed the Legal Action owner-occupier update and partly because we are gearing up to move, which is pretty stressful – so, no deep dive into the Homelessness etc Bill this week).\u00a0 It’s late on a Thursday night, and so I hope it’s ok if I post below some of what is included in the owner-occupier update, which is (or may be) of relevance to Wales.\u00a0 I’m also going to take a break next week.\u00a0 Here we go then:<\/p>\n
Coastal 2<\/strong><\/p>\n I am reliably informed that Coastal 2 is now going to be heard in the High Court on 29-31st July.\u00a0 See you there – it will be a humdinger.\u00a0 In the unlikely even that anybody wants to share their gossip about it, or skeleton arguments, do send it\/them my way :).<\/p>\n Coastal 1<\/strong><\/p>\n There is nothing to report except that it has not been listed for a hearing yet.\u00a0 I have heard vague stirrings but nothing to report.\u00a0 Casetrack simply records “18-Mar-2025: Case passed to List Office”.<\/p>\n Sharp practice on possession<\/strong><\/p>\n Quick Property Sale Limited v Solaja<\/em> [2025] EWHC 1257 (Ch)<\/p>\n Although pursued successfully on the basis of undue influence and impossibility, this case is of broader significance as highlighting certain practices employed as well as a reminder, more technically, about the significance of s. 2, Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.<\/p>\n Mr and Mrs Solaja\u2019s property was re-possessed by their mortgagee.\u00a0 Six days later, they entered into a written agreement with the Claimant to sell the property to it.\u00a0 The agreement was procured by a Mr Essien.\u00a0 The description of his \u201cbusiness model\u201d is as follows:<\/p>\n Mr Essien’s business model is to access and use the information in County Court cause lists (published on CourtServe) to identify claims in which the claimant is a mortgage lender, and the defendant is an individual. He then uses people-tracing tools to find the owners and address of the property concerned, and, as he put it, start sending letters.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Following this model, he arranged a sale to the Claimant, introducing Mr and Mrs Solaja to a particular solicitor, while they were navigating the local authority temporary accommodation situation.\u00a0 The deposit for the agreement was \u00a3231,000, which was to be held by the solicitor as stakeholder under the contract.\u00a0 The solicitor sought to use that deposit to redeem the mortgage.\u00a0 The mortgagee refused to accept those funds in the absence of the solicitor providing confirmation that those funds were a gift or loan to the Solajas.<\/p>\n Master Clark, taking a point not argued by the parties, held that the purported agreement was unenforceable under s. 2, Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 because it did not contain the term that the deposit was to be used by way of loan to redeem the mortgage.\u00a0 Indeed, the contract was inconsistent with what had been agreed between the parties.<\/p>\n Further, Master Clark held that the Defendants were entitled to set aside the transaction as a result of undue influence of which the Claimant had notice, and had failed to comply with the Etridge<\/em> protocol.\u00a0 Further, the agreement was impossible to perform because the deposit could not have been paid to the mortgagee, and, indeed, the Claimant\u2019s director was very clear it was not their intention to make a loan of that money to the Solajas.<\/p>\n Note to duty solicitors: Beware what goes on outside court.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Breathing space and mental health moratoria<\/strong><\/p>\n The obscurely drafted Debt Respite Scheme (Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental Health Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020 continue to produce litigation despite the evident intention behind them.\u00a0 The regulations have been described as \u201c\u2026 leaving a lot to be desired, so Guidance from Court decisions is in demand\u201d,[2]<\/a> and the drafting \u201cimpossible to admire\u201d.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n Bluestone Mortgages Limited v Stoute<\/em> [2025] EWHC 755 (Ch)<\/p>\n This appeal concerned whether the enforcement of a debt that is outside a mental health moratorium requires the permission of the court when it is \u201cmixed\u201d with a debt that is within the moratorium.\u00a0 In this case, the Claimant obtained a possession order on the mortgage they had granted to Mr and Mrs Stoute prior to Mr Stoute entering into a series of mental health moratoria, and a money judgment for around \u00a3315,000.\u00a0 That was not a moratorium debt.\u00a0 However, in the absence of the enforcement of the order (after a series of suspensions of warrant), there were further arrears of around \u00a3110,000.\u00a0 Those arrears were a moratorium debt.<\/p>\n Prior to the hearing of the appeal, the moratorium was cancelled as having been materially irregular and unfairly prejudiced the Claimant.<\/p>\n Regulation 7 provides that a creditor is prevented, without the permission of the court, from taking any steps to take any enforcement action \u201cin respect of\u201d a moratorium debt.\u00a0 Enforcement action includes taking a step to enforce a judgment or order issued by a court or tribunal before or during a moratorium period \u201cregarding\u201d a moratorium debt, or enforcing security held \u201cin respect of\u201d a moratorium debt.<\/p>\n The issue is whether the enforcement of the non-moratorium debt is taking a step regarding a moratorium debt or enforcing securing \u201cin respect\u201d of a moratorium debt.<\/p>\n Mellor J held that it was, dismissing the Claimant\u2019s submissions.\u00a0 In particular, agreeing with HHJ Parker, he considered that, if the Claimant were correct, the mortgagor would have the opportunity to seek a stay or suspension under s. 36, Administration of Justice Act 1970, but that would usually involve payment towards the arrears which would be towards a moratorium debt.<\/p>\n Considering the context of the Regulations, Mellor J found that the Claimant\u2019s argument that it should be entitled to enforce the non-moratorium debt automatically (ie without the permission of the court) would effectively strip the Regulations of their purpose.\u00a0 This was because the effect \u201cwould necessarily entail eviction from and then the sale of the family home. In my judgment, there are very few events which could be more detrimental to the debtor’s mental health than those\u201d.[4]<\/a>\u00a0 Accordingly, the words \u201cregarding\u201d and \u201cin respect of\u201d took their natural meaning.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Forbes v Interplay Funding Limited<\/em> [2025] EWCA Civ 690<\/p>\n The question in this appeal was whether a mortgage debt, where the principal has become due before the moratorium commences, is a \u201cnon-eligible debt\u201d.\u00a0 Reg 5(4)(a) provides that a non-eligible debt is a \u201csecured debt which does not amount to arrears in respect of secured debt.\u201d\u00a0 By Reg 2, \u201carrears\u201d means \u201cany sum other than the capitalised mortgage arrears payable to a creditor by a debt which has fallen due\u201d and not been paid.\u00a0\u00a0 Capitalised mortgage arrears is \u201cany arrears in relation to a mortgage that have been added to the outstanding balance to be paid over the duration of the mortgage.\u201d<\/p>\n Zacaroli LJ held that arrears did not include the principal sum of secured debt, whether or not called in prior to the commencement of the moratorium.[5]<\/a>\u00a0 Various reasons were given for that decision, including the artificiality of such a distinction between a debt called in before or after the commencement of a moratorium,[6]<\/a> and the analogy with the Insolvency Act bankruptcy and IVA regimes.[7]<\/a>\u00a0 Arrears carries its natural meaning: \u201cIn order for something to be added to the outstanding balance it must be different from the outstanding balance itself\u201d.[8]<\/a>\u00a0 Further,<\/p>\n [There are ] \u2026 three requirements before arrears are excluded from non-eligible secured debt: (1) the arrears must have been due as at the date of the application for the moratorium<\/em>; (2) the arrears must be of instalments that the debtor failed to pay in breach of the agreement or applicable legislation or rules<\/em>; and (3) the arrears cannot be those which have already been capitalised.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n The Court declined to consider a ground of appeal which would effectively have been an appeal of Mellor J\u2019s decision in Stoute<\/em> because it had not been fully argued before them.<\/p>\n Freemen of the land<\/strong><\/p>\n On 3rd<\/sup> April 2025, the Financial Conduct Authority issued a warning to borrowers in arrears about the so-called \u201cFreemen of the Land\u201d, identifying in relation to their arguments stemming from the Magna Carta that \u201cnone of these claims have succeeded as they\u2019re not legally valid\u201d<\/strong>.[10]<\/a>\u00a0 It has been reported that some of the videos produced have been viewed close to half a million times.[11]<\/a>\u00a0 Shelter now maintain a case law database of these issues (also covering council tax).[12]<\/a>\u00a0 There is currently a range of academic research under way on this philosophy.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n Ryan v LVR Capital Limited (In Administration)<\/em> [2024] EWHC 1866<\/p>\n It is not proposed to detail the convoluted facts in this matter, but an extended civil restraint order was made against Mr Ryan, who had (in essence) sought to avoid issues arising from various loans made by his company through issuing promissory notes and a document described as an Omniversal Security Agreement, and various purported trusts and powers of attorney.<\/p>\n Joanne Wicks KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge struck out the Claimant\u2019s claims, partly on the ground that they were incoherent and made no sense, and had been brought against the company in administration without the consent of the administrators or permission of the court (as required by Sch B1, para 43(6), Insolvency Act 1986).\u00a0 The Deputy Judge commented that the Claimant\u2019s communications and contentions comprised, \u201c\u2026 legal gobbledegook, a stitching-together of legal-sounding phrases, quotes from cases and names of statutes without any solid basis in legal principle. Phil Ryan’s pseudolaw is drawn in part from the USA and contains references to both English and American statutory and other legal texts, particularly the Uniform Commercial Code, which is a set of laws governing commercial transactions in the USA, uniformly adopted into the law of each state\u201d.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n [1]<\/a> https:\/\/www.fca.org.uk\/consumers\/struggling-mortgage-avoid-risky-offers<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Bluestone Mortgages Limited v Stoute<\/em> [2025] EWHC 755 (Ch), [28]<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Seculink Ltd v Forbes<\/em> [2025] EWHC 524 (Ch), [21], Mann J.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> [62].<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> [71]<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> [60]-[61]<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> [62]-[64]<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> [53]<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> [54]<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> https:\/\/www.fca.org.uk\/consumers\/struggling-mortgage-avoid-risky-offers.<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/money\/2025\/jun\/08\/freemen-on-the-land-fotl-mortgages-fca<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> https:\/\/england.shelter.org.uk\/professional_resources\/news_and_updates\/freeman_on_the_land_case_law_round_up<\/p>\n