The PSOW Consultation Outcome

The Public Services Ombuds has decided to conduct its own investigation into two unnamed “housing associations” over their response to disrepair, with a focus on damp and mould, in respect of vulnerable tenants.  On 23rd October 2026, it issued a special edition of its newsletter about housing complaints in which it identified the range of complaints it receives in this area, the action it had taken, and the action it now proposes to take following its consultation exercise.  In essence, the action is an own investigation into these two unnamed HAs, but also they “… will continue to review whether we should also propose Own Initiative investigations of other bodies”.  The full proposal contains its reasoning based on responses to its consultation and its own evidence from household complaints, and “… would provide an opportunity to explore how all reports of disrepair, damp and mould are being addressed, taking into consideration the needs of the tenant and other residents of the property.” The proposal addresses the relevant criteria for such an investigation – public interest; reasonable suspicion of systemic maladministration; impacting on a wide group of citizens, to such an extent that they appear likely to sustain injustice or hardship in consequence of the matter being considered for investigation; and the weight and persuasiveness of the evidence.  I am all for increased intervention by Ombuds and have previously been somewhat critical of the PSOW’s use of its powers.  Broadly, these investigations can be a good thing, but experience suggests that they lead to defensive responses.  What follows is just a brief summary of some of the potential issues/pitfalls/causes of defensive responses.  It is based on research with English social landlords, and, of course, that is a very different environment to the more collaborative Welsh approach.  However, there may be some lessons here in what, perhaps inevitably, is going to be construed as potentially threatening investigation.

My experience of research with HAs in England is that these investigations can be highly charged events.  The first question which might be asked is “why us?”.  After all, the number of complaints to the PSO (representing part of their evidence base) is small compared with HA stock levels.  And HAs feel that they conduct a large number of repairs each year which are successful – it is only the minority which (and most accept this in most cases) give cause for grievance.  I am definitely not an apologist for social landlords (the reverse accusation is commonly levelled at me); but, while the PSOW has made a range of generic points about the effects of disrepair, damp and mould, which are important and well-made, we are somewhat in the dark on the “why us?” question.  In terms of the persuasiveness of the evidence, they say:

Our view is that the range of evidence we have obtained, including from our own casework, Welsh Government, other interested parties, and tenants themselves, is credible, reliable and suggestive of potential systemic maladministration in how social housing providers are responding to reports of disrepair, damp and mould from vulnerable tenants.

And, we must trust their reading of that range of evidence.  It is right to say that this has been an area of concern for the WG and the updated Welsh Housing Quality Standard reflects that anxiety, which they will monitor.  But, that makes it less clear about the timing of the PSOW’s intervention.  They felt that delaying their investigations would not be necessary, and have suggested a gap in the standard (regarding issues which were not initially identified as a significant risk), as well as their ability to make recommendations regarding the WHQS.  You can see their point about broader regulation of the sector, but then the two HAs selected might feel like pawns in a more political game (like English providers did).

The next question will be about the conduct of the investigation.  This will also be controversial, and the PSOW will need to think about how it will handle this investigation by reference to other regulatory investigatory practices.  Care will need to be taken not to be too intrusive, remembering that these are regulated organisations; but, at the same time, obtaining sufficient data which can be analysed to identify the issues.

Finally, reporting is a highly charged, political event.  Words have to be chosen carefully.  Playing to an audience is an important part of Ombud work in terms of publicising their role but there is a fine line between that and completely undermining the organisational trust which needs to exist on an ongoing basis.  The best such investigations, in my view, are those which lead to an ongoing relationship between the organisation and the Ombud, in which the Ombud is an ongoing resource and critical friend.  Own investigations, however, carry the heavy stick, not the carrot.  And, returning to the desire to improve the WHQS, the robustness of the data for any recommendations will need to be considered.