Intentional homelessness

I’ve recently been teaching homelessness law to our undergraduate students (well, I get two lectures and one seminar on it to around 45 students).  I cover intentional homelessness and, in particular, the decision in Haile v Waltham Forest LBC [2015] UKSC 34.  I tell the students that, while I can tell them what the Supreme Court said, I cannot really explain it.  I also say that, because of that, it is great that the Welsh Government is seeking to get rid of it from Welsh law.  It remains relevant until the Homelessness and Social Housing Allocation Bill is enacted and comes into force; and 87 households were found to be intentionally homeless in 2024-5.  So, this still remains relevant.  Even after the Bill becomes law, the jurisprudence may be employed in relation to the new clause on allocations (which was considered in this post).

The recent decision in Cifci v Sutton LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1480 needs to be considered.  The Court of Appeal attempt to explain Haile and, in a way, it is a masterful attempt.  But, you may feel that, in so doing, it has rather explained it away rather than given it full force.  This is proper “law” post, then, in which the law is considered.  Before reading on, and without wishing to patronise, do look up the provision on intentional homelessness in section 77 and section 78 if you are not familiar with them.

Haile v Waltham Forest

Let’s start with Haile.

In essence, what the Supreme Court seem to have said is that whether a deliberate act causes homelessness depends on whether, at the date of application or review, something which actually happened broke the chain of causation.  In Haile itself, Ms Haile, who was pregnant, left her accommodation because she “was unhappy about smells” there.  The accommodation was for single people only.  She was pregnant.  She later gave birth.  The local authority found her intentionally homeless on the basis that of her deliberate act in leaving the accommodation which caused her to lose and which would have been available for her until she gave birth.  The Court found, however, that while that might have been a correct decision on the terms of the section itself, “… the legislation is concerned with the applicant’s homelessness at the time of the authority’s inquiry, and therefore with the intentionality of that state of homelessness. … [A]ny consideration of intentional homelessness arises after it has been decided that a person is homeless, and looks backwards to determine the operative cause of that homelessness” ([60]).  And:

… a later event constituting an involuntary cause of homelessness can be regarded as superseding the applicant’s earlier deliberate conduct, where in view of the later event it cannot reasonably be said that, but for the applicant’s deliberate conduct, he or she would not have become homeless. Where, however, the deliberate conduct remains a “but for” cause of the homelessness, and the question is whether the chain of causation should nevertheless be regarded as having been interrupted by some other event, the question will be whether the proximate cause of the homelessness is an event which is unconnected to the applicant’s own earlier conduct, and in the absence of which homelessness would probably not have occurred.

Waltham Forest’s decision was overturned because no consideration was given to whether the cause of Ms Haile’s homelessness was her surrender of the tenancy:

The consequence of the appellant’s giving birth to her baby is that it cannot be said, in relation to her earlier conduct in leaving the hostel, that “if she had not done that deliberate act she would not have become homeless”. … The birth of the baby meant that the appellant would be homeless, at the time when her case was considered, whether or not she had left the hostel when and for the reasons that she did. …

Cifci v Sutton LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1480

At first sight, Cifci is on all fours with Haile.  The Cifci family were provided with temporary accommodation in the private sector by Bromley LBC in satisfaction of the main housing duty.  Bromley offered the Cifci family alternative accommodation but they refused it.  Bromley then offered the family 28 day accommodation at a different property (we can just call it 226A).  They then applied to Sutton and were found to have made themselves intentionally homeless as a result of that refusal.  They argued that refusal was immaterial because they had been required to leave the property immediately and that was the cause of their approach to Sutton.  As Mr Cifci’s barristers put it:

The only tenable finding … is that Mr Cifci’s cessation of occupation of 22 Church Road was in consequence of the landlord’s notice. It was the notice which prompted Bromley to offer Mr Cifci alternative accommodation and to insist on his leaving after he had refused it. Bromley itself explained that it would have given Mr Cifci 28 days to vacate 22 Church Road but for the fact that the “lease end deadline to vacate the property” had “already passed”. The fundamental question, Mr Burton said, is why Bromley asked Mr Cifci to leave 22 Church Road, and the answer is that it did so because of the landlord’s notice.

The Court seemed to struggle with two lines of authority – there was Haile, on the one hand; and, on the other, there is the line of authority that one needs to ask what is the real or operative cause of somebody’s homelessness? (Chishimba v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2013] EWCA Civ 786); and, further, “If there is more than one operative or effective cause it suffices that only one of them is the deliberate act or omission of the applicant”.

The Court said that the single issue was whether Mr Cifci’s loss of his accommodation was in consequence of his refusal of the offered property.  They found that the family had to move out not because of a possession order made against them or that the family was evicted, and nor did they leave at once.  So, the family only left their accommodation because they moved to 226A; and 226A was only offered to them because they refused the other property and declined to leave their current one.  And:

It may well be that the landlord’s notice could also be viewed as a cause of the departure, but, as was explained in Chishimba, “If there is more than one operative or effective cause it suffices that only one of them is the deliberate act or omission of the applicant”.

On a benevolent interpretation of the review decision, they had broadly covered off this point.

Brief discussion

Is the law on intentional homelessness after Haile any clearer now?  [a purely rhetorical question]