Compensation for no-fault eviction

I blogged about the Senedd’s Local Government and Housing Committee report on the private rented sector (“PRS”) late last year.  One of the recommendations in that report was that

The Welsh Government should explore the feasibility of enabling tenants who are subject to no-fault evictions to retain the last two months’ rent of their tenancy as compensation for the financial and wellbeing impact of a forced move, and write to us by April 2025 to set out its conclusions.

This was a suggestion taken from a submission by Generation Rent, I think, essentially to make landlords think more carefully about exercising their rights in this way.  I’ve been a bit sniffy about this suggestion (at least in my head), but have sort of moved to being a bit more on the fence about it.  There is an interesting article in Big Issue about it, with some comments from Acorn Cardiff and a case study.

What prompted the Big Issue‘s interest was the negative response by the WG to Recommendation 6, following a stakeholder event on 18th March 2025 citing “unintended consequences” making it unfeasible.  In brief, the reasoning appears to be:

• Undermines policy objective of six month notice period and leads to increased risk of homelessnesss.  The suggestion is, I think, that only allowing the last two months would create an incentive to stay in the property until the end of that notice (as is your right) and delay finding alternative accommodation.  I think that this is a poor reason.
• Increased rent costs.  Landlord would likely backfill their rental costs to make up for that potential loss of two months rent, impacting on all tenants.  I think that this could be more carefully modelled and controlled.
• Mortgage/lending rules and supply impact.  The change could lead to being a risk factor for lenders, which would make mortgages for rental properties more expensive.  The mortgage industry does not seem to have been represented on the stakeholder engagement, but point taken about the Bank of England’s stress testing for buy-to-let mortgages, which include “… a rental coverage ratio of 140% for standard buy to let properties and an income stress test to demonstrate that landlords can afford to make payments should interest rates rise to 5.5%.”
• Implications for low income tenants in receipt of benefits.  Any requirement like the regulation may be construed as a non-liability for rent.  This is neutral at best and depends on the framing of the clause.  It might affect tenants’ credit rating if benefits were affected.  Same comment.  A landlord paid direct would be required to repay to DWP.  Same but also, some might say, why not?  It would have a particular impact on tenants moving from housing benefit to universal credit.  Accordingly, “Such an approach is therefore likely to have the unintended consequence of benefitting tenants with higher disposable incomes and/or savings and adversely impacting low-income tenants”
• There is existing support for those struggling to pay additional rent or a deposit from local authorities.

So, in short, this proposal does not seem to be going anywhere right now.