

Getting the Vote Out: Constituency Campaigning and Canvassing for Support at the 2011 National Assembly of Wales Election

An increasing volume of research has suggested the efficacy of get-out-the-vote campaigns in the UK; having identified their potential supporters parties contact them to encourage turnout on election day. This paper illustrates these findings with data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study. Each of the four main parties concentrated its attention on those who voted for it at the previous contest in 2007; those contacted – especially those contacted via media other than leaflets – were more likely to vote for the party again in 2011 than those who were not contacted.

Keywords: campaigning, contact, voting, Wales, 2011

Research during the last three decades has substantially overturned the previous belief among UK psephologists that local campaigning at British general elections has little if any impact on the outcome. Studies using a range of indicators of the varying intensity of those local campaigns have shown that, for example, the more a party spends promoting its candidate – relative to its opponents – the better her/his performance (Johnston and Pattie, 2014). These aggregate studies have been bolstered in their conclusions by survey data, especially those with panel designs, which have shown that electors contacted by a party during its canvassing activities are more likely to vote for it than those who receive no such contact (Johnston et al., 2012, 2013).

Virtually all of that research has focused on general elections, which attract the highest levels of turnout within the UK. Other contests – such as those for local governments, devolved bodies, and the European Parliament – generally attract less attention from both the media and the voting public. In those cases, contact with one or more of the parties is likely to have a strong influence on whether members of the electorate vote at such contests. Some will always vote, because they see it as their civic duty to do so; some will never vote, because they are either alienated from the political arena or/and believe their votes would have no influence; and some may be inclined to vote, but the probability of their doing so is influenced by whether their support is canvassed. Parties concentrate their canvassing and campaigning activities on the last of those groups, first to identify them (in some cases updating records of their supporters from previous elections) and then mobilising those whose support is perceived as vital to their success by contacting (and in some cases re-contacting) them again as election day approaches.

In this paper, we explore whether contacting was an important influence on voting at the 2011 elections to the National Assembly for Wales, using data from the 2011 Welsh Election Survey.¹ Although this had a panel design, we focus here on the post-election wave, in which respondents were asked about contacts with the parties during the election campaign, and how they voted on the day;² we also use recall data obtained in the pre-election wave on how respondents voted at the previous Assembly election in 2007.

¹ The 2011 Welsh Election Study was supported by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062-23-2625). The study was co-directed by Roger Scully and Richard Wyn Jones, with all fieldwork carried out by YouGov via the internet.

² The pre-election wave was a rolling survey during the month preceding the election, with around one-quarter of the respondents interviewed in each of those four weeks. Although it can be used to investigate changes in attitudes and planned voting during the campaign itself, there is potential overlap in the responses to the contact questions, especially for those not interviewed in the pre-election wave until the week before the election.

The National Assembly for Wales is elected by a form of proportional representation. It comprises 60 Assembly Members (AMs), 40 of whom are elected from single-member constituencies using the first-past-the-post plurality system and the other 20 from party lists in five regions; allocation of the latter seats is arranged so that each party's number of AMs for the region – including the constituency seats there – is, as far as possible, commensurate with its share of the votes cast in the regional contest. Our attention here focuses mainly on the 40 contests for constituency members, although some of the canvassing and campaigning by the parties will have been directed as much at voting in the regional list contests as in those for the constituency members (on which see more below).

Much of the research reported on campaign effects has used relatively sophisticated statistical procedures, designed to control for other influences in order to focus directly on any independent influences that local campaigning might have on voting patterns. In this paper, however, we use a more straightforward approach, examining the main patterns in the raw data only. Those data strongly indicate that contacting voters can bring substantial benefits: those contacted by a party, especially those who previously supported it, are more likely to vote for it than those who are not.

The election

Some analysts treat contests for bodies such as the National Assembly of Wales as 'second order elections' at which, at least in part, voters take the opportunity to evaluate the party(ies) in power at Westminster following the preceding general election; negative evaluations by those who voted for the party(ies) in power result in either (temporary) transfer of their support to one of the opposition parties or abstention. Recent analyses have suggested, however, that many voters treat elections to the 'devolved bodies' as 'local first order elections', making partisan choices on the basis of their evaluations of the performance of the party(ies) in power there (Scully, 2013; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006). In this case, therefore, in determining their choices Welsh voters would be reflecting in 2011 on the government's performance over the preceding four years.

The 2011 Welsh Assembly election was held at the end of a period of coalition government. With 26 seats Labour was short of an overall majority after the 2007 contest; after a brief period in which it formed a minority administration, it entered into a coalition with Plaid Cymru, which won 15 seats. The Conservatives won 12 seats, the Liberal Democrats 6, and there was one independent member. In 2011 Labour increased its share of the constituency votes by nearly 10 percentage points, from 32.2% to 42.3% (Table 1), winning 28 of the 40 seats; a further two in the list contests making it just one seat short of an overall majority. Both its coalition partner, Plaid Cymru, and the Liberal Democrats experienced losses of both votes and seats; the Conservatives increased their vote share and seat tally, however.

At the individual level, change in party support was relatively small between the two elections: 73 per cent of the 1,221 respondents who recalled voting for one of the four largest parties (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru) in 2007 reported voting for the same party again four years later.³ Indeed, Table 2 shows that both the Conservatives and Labour retained the support of 81 per cent of their 2007 voters, and Plaid Cymru retained 69 per cent; the Liberal Democrats lost over half of their support, however, substantially to Labour and to a lesser extent the other two. A majority of those who didn't vote in 2007 repeated that performance in 2011, and a

³ This is probably a conservative estimate of the volume of change, because it relies on respondent recall of how they voted in 2007 which may be influenced by how they intended to vote four years later (we use the pre-election survey recall information).

majority of those who couldn't remember how they voted four years previously failed to vote in 2011.

The pattern of contact

In the post-election wave of the survey, respondents were asked 'Were you contacted by someone from a political party during the election campaign?'; if they answered yes, they were asked which parties. For each party they reported having been contacted by they were asked whether that was by: telephone call; leaflets or other mail delivered to your home; a visit to your home; contact in the street; email; Twitter, Facebook or other social networks; text message; and other. They were not asked how many times they were contacted by each method, however.

The main purpose of local party campaigns is to identify individuals likely to vote for them, and then try and ensure that they turn out and do so. The campaigning aims are thus partly informational – making sure voters know that there is an election, what the issues are, and who the party's local candidate is – and then mobilising their identified potential supporters. The focus of the latter activity is largely on latter group: those seen as either committed or likely to vote for its candidate then receive further attention to encourage them to turn out and vote, whereas others receive little, if any, further attention. Leaflets play an important informational role in this activity, but their delivery is in general less targeted than the other forms of contact: leaflets may be delivered to all homes in a selected area (selected usually because the party knows it is relatively strong there), for example, whereas the other forms of contact – especially home visits and personal contacts via email and text – are likely to be focused much more on known supporters only. For that reason we look separately at contact via leaflet only and via other methods.

Table 3 shows the percentage of all respondents reporting contacts with the four main parties during the 2011 campaign: most reported no contact with each of the parties, and 73 per cent reported that they had not been contacted by any of them. Labour was by far the most active in contacting voters via all seven media – overall it contacted just under 18 per cent of all respondents – and the Liberal Democrats were the least active, contacting fewer than 8 per cent (and there was a clear correlation between the volume of contacts – Table 3 – and the overall result – Table 1). Contacting via a leaflet was the most commonly reported form for each party, and home visits the second most. Few voters said they were contacted via the more targeted 'modern' media (emails, texts and social networking sites); only Labour made (relatively) extensive use of the telephone to contact voters and the Liberal Democrats were the largest users of text messaging.

Contact and support

But was contacting effective? This question is first addressed by exploring whether voters who supported a party in the constituency contest in 2007 were more likely to do so again in 2011 if they were contacted during the latter campaign than if they were not. Table 4 gives fairly unequivocal evidence that they were; it contrasts, for each set of 2007 party supporters, those not contacted in the 2011 campaign with both those contacted by leaflet only and those contacted via one or more other methods.

Of the 236 respondents who voted Conservative in the 2007 constituency contests, 181 (77 per cent) recalled no contact from the party during the 2011 campaign; 78.5 per cent of them voted Conservative again. Of those who received a leaflet but no other contact (only 12 respondents), 83.3 per cent remained Conservative voters, whereas of those contacted via other, more personal, media, continued support for the party was higher: among the 30 contacted through one medium other than a leaflet it was 93.3 per cent, and all of those contacted through more than two media

remained Conservative voters (although the sample size for this group is extremely small). Similar differences are reported for the other three parties. The largest gap is for the Liberal Democrats, who did least campaigning overall; only 36.4 per cent of their 2007 voters not contacted supported the party again in 2011, compared to 71.4 per cent of those contacted through just one medium other than a leaflet.

Overall, therefore, contacting one's own supporters, especially through the more personal media, yielded returns – they were more likely to vote for the party again than those who were not contacted. Can contact also win over converts? To address that question, we look at the 2007 supporters of the two parties in the constituency contests – Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru – who were most likely to vote for another in 2011 (Table 2). The numbers are small, but the findings are in general as expected. The first block of data in Table 5 examines Liberal Democrat voters in 2007, of whom 19 switched to the Conservatives in 2011, 36 to Labour and 20 to Plaid Cymru, with 66 remaining loyal to the Liberal Democrats. The first row shows very clearly that those the Liberal Democrats ignored during their campaigns were more likely to defect: of those who remained loyal to the party 73 per cent had not been contacted during the 2011 campaign, whereas between 90-100 per cent of those who switched to one of the other three parties received no contact at all from the Liberal Democrats. The remaining rows show the percentages of those who either defected or remained loyal and who received contacts from the party they voted for in 2011. Of those who shifted to the Conservatives, 16 per cent were contacted by them in one or more ways other than by leaflets; of those who shifted to Labour the percentage was double that at 31, whereas it was 17 for those who moved to Plaid Cymru; and 18 per cent of those who remained loyal to the Liberal Democrats were contacted by that party other than by leaflet. Contact from the Liberal Democrats helped to retain some of its 2007 support; those ignored in 2007 and contacted by one of the other parties were more likely to defect to the latter, however.

Those who changed their allegiance from the Liberal Democrats were less likely to have been contacted during the Liberal Democrat campaign than those who remained loyal to the party, therefore, and were more likely to have been contacted – other than by leaflet – by the party to which they switched their support. The same was true with regard to the – smaller – numbers who defected from Plaid Cymru between the two contests. The more contact with Plaid Cymru in 2011, the more likely its 2007 supporters were to remain loyal; the more contact there was with another party, the more likely they were to switch allegiance.

What, finally, of the 374 respondents who didn't vote in the 2007 constituency contests, of whom 157 did turn out for one of the parties in 2011: were they more likely to do so if they were contacted?⁴ Table 6 again suggests that this was the case. Those making a switch were more likely to be contacted by the party that received their support in 2011 than those who were not. Among the switchers to Labour 23 per cent were contacted by that party, for example; only 8 per cent of them were contacted by either the Liberal Democrats or Plaid Cymru, and 11 per cent by the Conservatives. By contacting more potential switchers, Labour gained more converts. The difference was however smaller in the other three cases – especially for the Conservatives. In addition, those who remained as non-voters were very unlikely to have been contacted by any party during the campaign. Contacting – even if only by sending a leaflet – helped convince some non-voters to turn out and support the party seeking their vote.

But who was contacted, where?

⁴ Most of these respondents abstained in 2007 but one-fifth of them were aged under 25, many of whom would have been too young to vote then.

In general, therefore, contacting worked: it helped both to mobilise each party's own supporters (according to their previous voting behaviour) and, to some extent, to win over those who supported other parties at the preceding contest. But are the parties contacting the right people? If they want to get as many seats as possible within the constituency contest section of the election they should concentrate their contacting efforts on the marginal seats, those that they either won or lost at the previous contest by a relatively small majority. Turning out supporters again in constituencies where they have little or no chance of success will bring few rewards; nor will working too hard to mobilise support in constituencies where they are almost certain to win.

To test whether the parties operated such geographical targeting in 2011, the constituencies were grouped into four types for each party: those won by a safe margin in 2007 (by 10 percentage points or more); those won by a narrow margin then (less than ten points); those lost by a narrow margin (less than ten points); and the hopeless seats (lost by more than ten points). A rational campaign for constituency-contest votes would see the expenditure of human and financial resources concentrated in the second and third types, with very little in either the first or, especially, the fourth.

Table 7 records the percentages of each party's own constituency supporters in 2007 according to whether they had no contact with the party, whether any contact was by leaflet only, or whether there was one or more contacts other than by leaflet – by seat type. In its safe seats, Labour made no contact with 81 per cent of those who voted for it in those constituencies in 2007, only slightly less than the 88 per cent of those who voted for other parties there. In the marginal constituencies which Labour won in 2007, however, there was a much wider gap: 84 per cent of those who voted for another party there in 2007 received no contact from Labour, compared to 67 per cent of Labour's own voters. In the marginal seats it lost in 2007 and where it hoped for gains in order to form a majority government, there was more contact with both types of voter: 57 per cent of all 2007 Labour voters there were contacted by the party in 2011, as were 25 per cent of those who did not vote Labour at the earlier contest (i.e. in the former case, 43 per cent were not contacted; in the latter, 75 per cent). Very few people were contacted by leaflet alone; contacts via the other media were not only more numerous but also very much focused on the party's known supporters – with again the greatest amount of effort at winning over converts in the marginal seats where Labour lost in 2007 (17 per cent of non-Labour voters there were contacted, alongside 37 per cent of Labour's own voters – twice the percentages contacted in Labour's safe seats).

Labour clearly fought a relatively aggressive campaign according to these indicators, focusing in particular on the marginal seats that it lost in 2007 and paying relatively little attention to its supporters in its safe seats; it was campaigning to increase its vote and, especially, seat shares. The other parties operated more defensive campaigns, to a greater or lesser extent, seeking to sustain and consolidate support in their 'heartlands' rather than extend it – in part, no doubt, as the results in 2007 suggest, because more of their effort was focused on winning votes in the regional list contests. Each did win constituency seats in 2007, however, and would want to retain its hold on them, along with those where it lost by narrow margins. The Conservative party, for example, made contact with 45 per cent of its 2007 voters in its safe constituencies, for example, but only 17 per cent of voters there who supported another party in 2007 (Labour, too, only made contact with 19 per cent of its 2007 voters in its safe seats). There was a similar gap in the marginal constituencies won in 2007, but smaller differences in those lost – especially those lost by a wide margin (a gap of only 7 points). Conservative voters there in 2007 were much more likely to be contacted in 2011 through one or more ways other than leaflet than were non-Conservative voters, but such contact was concentrated in the party's heartland: 41 per cent of its own supporters were contacted in the marginal constituencies won in 2007, for example, but only 22 per cent in those lost then. The Liberal Democrats, even more than the Conservatives, concentrated on what they held, with little

attempt to mobilise support outwith the seats they won in 2007, and the same pattern – though slightly less extreme – characterised the Plaid Cymru campaign.

Although the contests for the constituency and regional seats were separate, much of the campaigning for the two was common: each party sought to maximise its support in both contests, while reflecting on variations in their likelihood of winning there. (In South Wales, for example, Labour was expected to win most of the constituency contests, in which case it was very unlikely to obtain any of the regional ‘top-up’ seats as well – and this was the case, as Table 1 implies; in such a situation ‘rational’ Labour supporters might allocate their regional votes to their ‘second choice parties’. The other parties’ main chances there were to win regional seats, however, and their campaigning may have stressed that.) Most of those surveyed voted for the same party in both contests, however: of those who supported one of the four main parties in the constituency contests, 75 per cent voted for the same party in the regional contest. All four parties got fewer votes in the regional than the constituency contests, however, because many of the ‘switchers’ who voted for one of them in the latter contests voted for either the Greens or UKIP in their region (neither of those parties fielded candidates in great majority of the constituency contests).

But did being contacted by a party during the campaign encourage support for it in the regional contest? Table 8 identifies the percentages of those who voted for each of the parties in the constituency contests in 2011 and who also voted for it in the regional contests, according to their contacts with the party during the campaign. Multiple contacts, other than by leaflet, clearly had an impact; those contacted through a range of media (who were few in number) were most likely on average to vote for that party in the regional as well as the constituency component of the election.

Conclusions

Experimental research testing the efficacy of get-out-the-vote campaigns has become quite common in the United States (Green and Gerber, 2008), but for a variety of reasons has attracted less interest in the UK (though see Denver, 2014; Fieldhouse et al., 2013, 2014). That American research has delivered very strong, positive results: the more effort made to contact voters and encourage them to exercise their democratic franchise, the more who do. Voters, on average, apparently appreciate not being taken for granted but instead being informed personally about the election and having their support solicited.

The data presented here for the 2011 Welsh Assembly elections have identified patterns consistent with those arguments. They are not conclusive evidence that contacting matters: it is possible that either all those contacted had decided how they would vote irrespective of the contact and/or the parties focused their efforts very strongly on those who had already made decisions favourable to them. If not conclusive, however, the data provide strong circumstantial evidence that, at this Welsh election: the parties focused their campaigning in targeted constituencies where they either wanted to win again or had a good chance of removing the incumbent party; within those targeted constituencies, they focused their efforts on those likely to vote for them (because either their databases from past elections or/and their more recent canvassing returns identified such individuals, or/and their experience of where their supporters are concentrated suggests which areas should be the focus of their attention); and those who supported a party in the constituency contests and were contacted by it were also more likely to support it at the regional contests too. Those contacted responded by voting for the party that contacted them – much more so than those not contacted. The 2011 Welsh local campaigns were effective, therefore: the more effort it expended in getting-out-the-vote, the better each party’s performance.

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Table 1. The results of the 2007 and 2011 elections to the National Assembly of Wales

Election	2007				2011			
	CV%	RV%	Seats		CV%	RV%	Seats	
			C	R			C	R
Labour	32.2	29.6	24	2	42.3	36.9	28	2
Conservative	22.4	21.4	5	7	25.0	22.5	6	8
Liberal Democrat	14.8	11.7	3	3	10.6	8.0	1	4
Plaid Cymru	22.4	21.0	7	8	19.3	17.9	5	6
Others	8.2	16.3	1	0	2.8	14.7	0	0
Turnout	43.7				42.2			

Key: CV% – percentage share of the votes cast in the constituency contests; RV% – percentage share of the votes cast in the regional contests C – seats won in the constituency contests; R – seats won in the regional contests.

Table 2. Voting at the 2007 and 2011 Constituency Contest Elections to the National Assembly of Wales (percentages of row totals): data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study

2007	2011 Vote						Σ
	DNV	Con	Lab	LD	PC	Other	
Did Note Vote	58	10	17	6	6	2	374
Conservative	6	81	5	2	3	3	236
Labour	7	3	81	2	5	2	570
Liberal Democrat	8	12	23	41	13	4	160
Plaid Cymru	6	7	11	4	69	3	255
Other	10	20	26	7	9	29	70
Don't Know	51	10	13	10	13	2	98
TOTAL	20	18	36	8	16	4	1763

Key: DNV – Did Not Vote; Con – Conservative; Lab – Labour; LD – Liberal Democrat; PC – Plaid Cymru.

Table 3. Percentage of respondents to the 2011 Welsh Election Study reporting different types of contact with the parties during the month before the Assembly election in 2011

	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrat	Plaid Cymru
Telephone call	1.7	4.5	0.8	1.7
Leaflet	8.3	13.6	7.2	8.8
Home visit	4.1	8.4	1.9	4.2
Street contact	0.7	2.1	0.5	1.7
Email	1.2	2.2	0.8	1.1
Social network	0.4	1.2	0.4	0.8
Text	0.2	0.2	7.9	0.2
No contact at all	89.4	82.1	92.1	88.9

Table 4. The pattern of contact during the 2011 Welsh Assembly election campaign, by party and voting; data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study.

	N	% Voted	N	% Voted
<i>Party voted for in 2007</i>	<i>Conservative</i>		<i>Labour</i>	
No Contacts	181	78.5	411	77.9
Received a Leaflet Only	12	83.3	23	78.3
Number of Contacts Other than Leaflet				
0	193	78.8	434	77.9
1	30	93.3	83	88.0
2	8	87.5	33	97.0
3	5	100.0	12	91.7
4	0	-	6	100.0
5	0	-	2	100.0
[More than 2	5	100.0	20	95.0]
<i>Party voted for in 2007</i>	<i>Liberal Democrat</i>		<i>Plaid Cymru</i>	
No Contacts	132	36.4	188	63.3
Received a Leaflet Only	12	50.0	6	83.3
Number of Contacts Other than Leaflet				
0	144	37.5	194	63.9
1	7	71.4	35	80.0
2	5	80.0	12	91.7
3	2	50.0	9	88.9
4	1	100.0	4	100.0
5	0	-	1	100.0
[More than 2	3	66.7	14	92.9]

Table 5. The pattern of contact and the percentages voting for each of the four main parties: Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru voters in 2007; data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study

<u>Party Voted for 2011</u>	<u>Con</u>	<u>Lab</u>	<u>LD</u>	<u>PC</u>
<i>Liberal Democrat</i>				
<u>Number of Voters in 2007</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>20</u>
No Contact Liberal Democrat	100	92	73	90
Contact Conservative				
Leaflet Only	5	8	9	0
One or More Other than Leaflet	16	6	3	5
Contact Labour				
Leaflet Only	11	8	11	5
One or More Other than Leaflet	11	31	9	0
Contact Liberal Democrat				
Leaflet Only	0	6	9	10
One or More Other than Leaflet	0	3	18	0
Contact Plaid Cymru				
Leaflet Only	0	11	12	17
One or More Other than Leaflet	5	6	6	17
<i>Plaid Cymru</i>				
<u>Number of Voters in 2007</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>176</u>
No Contact Plaid Cymru	78	96	82	68
Contact Conservative				
Leaflet Only	0	4	0	3
One or More Other than Leaflet	17	4	9	5
Contact Labour				
Leaflet Only	0	7	0	5
One or More Other than Leaflet	11	15	9	8
Contact Liberal Democrat				
Leaflet Only	0	0	0	6
One or More Other than Leaflet	6	4	18	4
Contact Plaid Cymru				
Leaflet Only	0	0	0	3
One or More Other than Leaflet	22	4	18	27

Key: Con – Conservative; Lab – Labour; LD – Liberal Democrat; PC – Plaid Cymru.

Table 6. The pattern of contacts and percentages voting for each of the four main parties, or not voting, in 2011 – non-voters in 2007; data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study

	Con	Lab	LD	PC	DNV
<u>Number Voting in 2011</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>265</u>
Contact with Conservatives					
None	88	89	82	95	95
Leaflet Only	2	4	12	5	3
One or More Other than Leaflet	10	8	6	0	2
Contact with Labour					
None	90	77	85	87	94
Leaflet Only	4	5	9	5	2
One or More Other than Leaflet	6	18	6	8	4
Contact with Liberal Democrats					
None	94	92	74	92	98
Leaflet Only	4	1	18	8	2
One or More Other than Leaflet	2	6	9	0	0
Contact with Plaid Cymru					
None	94	92	91	81	96
Leaflet Only	2	4	6	11	2
One or More Other than Leaflet	4	4	3	8	2

Key: Con – Conservative; Lab – Labour; LD – Liberal Democrat; PC – Plaid Cymru; DNV – Did Not Vote.

Table 7. The percentage of respondents contacted by each of the four main parties, according to the type of seat and whether they voted for the party in 2007; data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study

	No	LO	Other	No	LO	Other
<i>Party Voted for in 2007</i>	<i>Conservative</i>			<i>Labour</i>		
Won Safe						
Own supporter 2007	55	7	38	81	2	17
Other 2007	83	4	13	88	4	8
Won Marginal						
Own supporter 2007	59	5	41	67	5	28
Other 2007	82	0	13	84	5	11
Lost Marginal						
Own supporter 2007	74	5	22	43	7	37
Other 2007	89	4	16	75	8	17
Lost Hopeless						
Own supporter 2007	87	6	8	68	5	26
Other 2007	94	4	3	87	5	8
<i>Party Voted for in 2007</i>	<i>Liberal Democrat</i>			<i>Plaid Cymru</i>		
Won Safe						
Own supporter 2007	62	19	19	67	1	32
Other 2007	69	20	11	85	6	9
Won Marginal						
Own supporter 2007	100	0	19	64	0	36
Other 2007	77	5	0	77	7	16
Lost Marginal						
Own supporter 2007	73	13	13	72	0	28
Other 2007	85	9	6	83	3	15
Lost Hopeless						
Own supporter 2007	88	5	8	79	4	17
Other 2007	95	4	1	97	5	2

Key: N – no contact; LO – contact by leaflet only; Other – contact via one or more other media

Table 8. The pattern of contact and voting at the regional component of the 2011 Welsh Assembly election campaign, by party voted for in the constituency contests; data from the 2011 Welsh Election Study

Party Voted for in 2007	Conservative	Labour	LibDem	PC
No Contact	77.5	77.6	54.5	71.9
Received a Leaflet Only	100.0	80.6	58.8	93.3
Number of Contacts other than Leaflet				
0	78.7	77.8	55.1	73.2
1	76.9	75.5	46.2	74.4
2	90.9	71.1	83.3	75.0
3	83.3	92.3	100.0	88.9
4	-	87.5	100.0	75.0
5	-	50.0	100.0	100.0
[More than 2	88.2	87.0	100.0	85.7]